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     CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
The law of agency facilitates commercial transactions. It allows a person to conclude 
a contract without himself1 signing it, or even being present at the time of its conclu-
sion.2  
Company law is a confusing and often dangerous beast, replete with archaic and 
menacing rules such as the ultra vires doctrine and the doctrine of constructive no-
tice. It is trite that efficient rules of company law are vital for the stability of the econ-
omy, and that any uncertainty would detract from that stability. The concepts of a 
company‟s capacity and the authority of its representatives demand the highest de-
gree of certainty achievable, as these matters regulate a company‟s interaction with 
the outside world.3 Unfortunately, the common-law doctrines of company law have 
evolved to frustrate rather than to facilitate commercial dealings with companies. 
While no doubt born of the best intentions, the doctrines of ultra vires and construc-
tive notice have served only to prejudice third parties dealing with companies, there-
by hampering commercial activity. 
This chapter will introduce the topic of this thesis by identifying the aims of the dis-
sertation and setting out the relevant research problem, questions, and limitations. 
Chapter One will also provide a brief background on the issues to be discussed 
herein. 
1.2 Abstract 
An agent acting in excess of his authority creates several legal problems, particularly 
in company law. In South African law, like in many other legal systems around the 
world, the interplay between the doctrines of ultra vires and constructive notice has, 
historically, played a profound role in governing the relationship between a company, 
its representatives, and outsiders. For decades, the contractual capacity and conse-
quent liability of companies have been guided by thorny and intricate legal principles. 
                                                          
1
 Reference to the masculine gender should be interpreted to also refer to the feminine. 
2
 Provided, of course, that the person has the necessary capacity to do so. 
3
 Delport P „Companies Act 71 of 2008 and the “Turquand Rule”‟ (2011) THRHR 74 132 at 132. 
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This issue has become especially intriguing in light of the changes to the company 
law regime introduced by the new legislation. The relevant sections of the Compa-
nies Act 71 of 2008 (the 2008 Act) that allow for the restriction of a company‟s pow-
ers, require close scrutiny and thoughtful consideration. To that end, this thesis shall 
examine some of the legal consequences arising from the conclusion by a compa-
ny‟s agent of an “unauthorised contract”.4 
1.3 Research problem 
If P authorises A to conclude a contract with a third party on P‟s behalf, P is A‟s prin-
cipal and A is P‟s agent. Provided A acts within the scope and extent of his authority, 
the contract entered into will be valid and binding between P and the third party.5 
However, a quagmire of problems may arise if A contracts with a third party in ex-
cess of A‟s given authority. What is P‟s obligation, if any, towards the third party?  
What is A‟s obligation, if any, towards the third party? And will the position be differ-
ent if P is a company? The answers to these questions are of critical importance as 
unauthorised agency is an almost inevitable occurrence in commercial dealings.6 
The position of outsiders contracting with companies has historically been affected 
by two key common-law doctrines: the doctrine of ultra vires and the doctrine of con-
structive notice. After years of the ultra vires doctrine frustrating commercial dealings 
and prejudicing outsiders, Parliament saw fit to effectively abolish it by enacting s 36 
of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (the 1973 Act). Section 20(1) of the 2008 Act has 
reinforced this approach to the contractual capacity of companies. However, ss 19(4) 
and 19(5) of the 2008 Act bring something new to the table: these provisions effec-
tively abolish the doctrine of constructive notice while simultaneously retaining a wa-
tered-down version of it applicable to companies that elect to restrict their own ca-
pacity. In so doing, the 2008 Act creates two categories of companies, which in this 
thesis shall be termed “RF” companies and non-“RF” companies.  
                                                          
4
 Authority being an essential requirement of agency, and consensus ad idem being a requirement of 
a valid contract, it is of course oxymoronic to speak of “unauthorised agency” or an “unauthorised 
contract”. However, for brevity‟s sake, this thesis will make use of such terms.  
5
 See Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ in De Wet JC (founding ed) LAWSA vol1 Third Reissue 
(2014) para 126. 
6
 See Busch D & MacGregor L (eds) et al The Unauthorised Agent; Perspectives on European and 
Comparative Law (2009) 2. 
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By providing an option for a company to restrict its own contractual capacity, it would 
seem that the Legislature has reintroduced a slightly modified form of the ultra vires 
doctrine. In addition, the 2008 Act has created a statutory reformulation of the doc-
trine of constructive notice. If an “RF” company complies with the formal require-
ments stipulated by s 19(5)(a) of the 2008 Act, aspects of the ultra vires doctrine and 
the doctrine of constructive notice will influence every contract it concludes.7  
The impact of the 2008 Act on the contractual capacity of companies, the doctrine of 
constructive notice, and the authority of a company‟s agents, is of paramount im-
portance when determining the validity of unauthorised company contracts. Unfortu-
nately, the “RF” provisions are not entirely unambiguous, and definitely open to in-
terpretation. In 2012, the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (the 
CIPC) issued Practice Note 4 of 2012, in an attempt to clarify certain issues for prac-
titioners. However, the meaning and effect of the “RF” provisions remain largely un-
addressed in academic literature. 
1.4 Aims of the research 
The 2008 Act has brought profound changes to company law in South Africa, par-
ticularly in the area of corporate capacity. The new legislation has partially abolished 
the doctrine of constructive notice and effectively established two categories of com-
panies, one of which will “enjoy” certain consequences of the ultra vires doctrine. 
These changes are of great importance to the issue of a company‟s liability for unau-
thorised contracts, and are therefore deserving of academic attention. Practitioners 
and students of company law require a comprehensive and detailed understanding 
of the “RF” provisions. To that end, this thesis will analyse the relevant sections of 
the 2008 Act and some of their implications for a company, its agent, and an outsid-
er, in the event that a situation of unauthorised agency arises. 
Shortly after the 2008 Act came into effect, a call was made for thought and com-
ment on certain of the “RF” provisions.8 It is hoped that this thesis will serve as a 
suitable (partial) response to that call. 
 
                                                          
7
 In this regard, see 3.5.3 herein. 
8
 Jooste R „Observations on the impact of the 2008 Companies Act on the Doctrine of Constructive 
Notice and the Turquand rule‟ (2013) 130 SALJ 130 467. 
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1.5 Research questions 
This thesis will investigate two pressing issues which an outsider will be confronted 
with when he learns that he has concluded an unauthorised contract with an agent of 
a company: 
1) Is the contract valid and enforceable?  
2) If the contract is not enforceable, can the purported agent be held liable to 
compensate the outsider for loss suffered as a result of the unauthorised 
contract? 
  
1.6  Background to the study 
The law of agency permits one person (the principal) to authorise another person 
(the agent) to represent the principal for the purpose of concluding contracts with 
third parties. The common intention of all the parties in this legal phenomenon is to 
bring about a contract between the principal and the third party. The agent is gener-
ally not a party to the contract and incurs no liability thereunder.9 
Unauthorised agency is a course of events that creates considerable legal uncertain-
ty. This oxymoronic phenomenon arises where one person (the purported agent) 
purports to represent another person (the professed principal) in concluding a con-
tract with a third party, while lacking the necessary authority to bind the professed 
principal to the juristic act. The respective legal positions of the professed principal, 
the purported agent, and of the third party, are issues of great legal and commercial 
significance, and will depend largely upon the facts of each particular case.  
1.6.1 Liability of the principal 
An essential requirement of agency is that the agent must have been duly authorised 
by the principal before he can effectively conclude juristic acts on the principal‟s be-
                                                          
9
 „[A]n agent is now regarded as one to whom no contractual liability in respect of agreements, en-
tered into in the name of his principal, can possibly attach. He is simply and solely the representative 
of another. This view of the position of the modern agent is now so firmly established, and so general-
ly recognised, that no person dealing with an agent, as such, can be held to have intended to contract 
with him personally unless the terms of the contract itself make it clear that he did‟. Per Innes CJ in 
Blower v Van Noorden 1909 890 TS 899 [Emphasis added].  
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half. Whether an agent has indeed been authorised to represent his principal will al-
ways be a question of fact.10  
When acting on behalf of his principal, the agent is restricted to performing those 
acts which he has been authorised to perform. Since authority is required for valid 
representation, a principal cannot be bound to a contract outside the scope of the 
agent‟s given authority. Put differently, an agent purporting to contract with a third 
party, in excess of his authority, cannot bind the principal to that contract. In fact, the 
purported contract would be void ab initio for lack of consensus. This rule goes to the 
foundations of the South African law of agency.11 
However, an unauthorised contract may yet be saved. It may be validated by the 
principal‟s subsequent ratification. A second exception to the general rule exists in 
the doctrine of agency by estoppel, more commonly referred to as “ostensible au-
thority”, or “apparent authority”.12 Ratification and agency by estoppel were tradition-
ally the only two recognised ways in which a professed principal could incur liability 
on, and reap the benefits of, an unauthorised contract.13 
1.6.2 Personal liability of the purported agent towards the third party14 
As a general rule, an agent will incur no liability in respect of a contract between his 
principal and a third party.15 However, a purported agent may in two ways incur per-
sonal liability as a result of his misrepresentation of authority: by agreement, or by 
operation of law. 
A purported agent and a third party may agree that the former will incur personal lia-
bility in certain circumstances. For example, they may agree that the purported agent 
warrants the existence of his authority, and will incur liability if he has acted in ex-
                                                          
10
 See Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ (2014) para 133. 
11
 See Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ (2014) para 137. 
12
 See NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce Company Ltd and Others 2002 (2) SA 262 (A), South African 
Broadcasting Corporation v Coop 2006 (2) SA 217 (SCA), and Northern Metropolitan Local Council v 
Company Unique Finance 2012 (5) SA 323 (SCA).  Kerr prefers the term “apparent” over “ostensible” 
in this context, as the word “apparent” is used generally in the law of contract. See Kerr AJ The Law 
of Agency 4 ed (2006) 25. 
13
 See Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ (2014) para 137. 
14
 There is still uncertainty in South African law about a purported agent‟s liability towards third parties 
in the context of an unauthorised contract, particularly regarding the basis and extent of such liability. 
See Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ (2014) para 163 and Chapter Four herein. 
15
 This position has been confirmed on numerous occasions by South African courts. See in this re-
gard, Marais v Perks 1963 (4) SA 802 (E) 806 F-G, and Nordis Construction Co (Pty) Ltd v Theron, 
Burke and Isaacs 1972 (2) SA 535 544-5H. 
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cess thereof. This warranty of authority would be a distinct contract from the one be-
tween the principal and the third party.16 If it is revealed that the purported agent 
lacked the authority he claimed to have had, he will have breached the contract be-
tween himself and the third party.17 The nature and extent of the purported agent‟s 
liability in the event of a breach of a warranty of authority will be governed by the 
terms of that contract.18 It should be noted that a purported agent may expressly or 
tacitly bind himself to the third party in this way.   
In the absence of an agreement to that effect, South African law can impose liability 
on a purported agent for damages in respect of loss caused to the third party as a 
result of the conclusion of an unauthorised contract. Such liability would be based 
either on delictual principles,19 or on the breach of a fictional contract (the “implied 
warranty of authority”).20 
1.6.3 Agency principles in company law 
It is trite that a company is a fictitious person. As such, it cannot perform acts by and 
for itself. A company can only conclude contracts through duly authorised represent-
atives acting on its behalf. Therefore, the principles of the law of agency impact 
greatly on company law.21  
The relationship between a company and its representatives is generally a principal-
agent relationship, albeit one with special characteristics.22 Therefore, the same 
general rule of agency will apply in company law: a company‟s representative con-
tracting in excess of his authority cannot bind the company to that contract. 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ (2014) para 166. 
17
 Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ (2014) para 165. 
18
 Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ (2014) para 166. If the contract makes no provision for the 
nature and extent of the purported agent‟s liability, and none can be implied, the “implied warranty of 
authority” may be applied. See Kerr AJ The Law of Agency (2006) at 245. This remedy will be dis-
cussed in Chapter Four.  
19
 See Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ (2014) para 165. 
20
 A rule of law developed by Innes CJ in Blower v Van Noorden at 900-901. 
21
 Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ in Cassim FHI (man.ed) et al 
Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) at 187. 
22
 See Cassim R „Governance and the Board of Directors' in Cassim FHI (man.ed.) Contemporary 
Company Law 2 ed (2012) at 412. 
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1.6.4 The impact of company law doctrines on the validity of unauthorised company 
contracts 
1.6.4.1 The doctrine of ultra vires  
For many years, companies did not enjoy the same contractual capacity as natural 
persons. A company‟s business was, in the past, required to be stipulated in a “main 
objects” clause contained in the company‟s Memorandum of Association (MOA). The 
company‟s contractual capacity would be limited to concluding contracts related to or 
reasonably incidental to that main object.23 In fact, companies were regarded in law 
to exist only for the purpose of concluding those contracts related to or in furtherance 
of their main object.24 Any contract concluded outside of that limited sphere was void 
ab initio, and was incapable of ratification by the shareholders of the company.25 This 
became known as the ultra vires doctrine.  
Ostensibly, the purpose of the ultra vires doctrine was the protection of a company‟s 
shareholders, potential investors, and its creditors. In theory, the “main objects” 
clause was intended to place these parties in a position to better evaluate the risk of 
investing in or dealing with a company. However commendable the initial aim of the 
ultra vires doctrine may have been, the doctrine would always operate to protect a 
company at the expense of outsiders. Eventually, its application and its very legiti-
macy became questionable as a result of the abuse of the “main objects” clause.26 
The ultra vires doctrine was in large part abolished by the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
(the 1973 Act). According to s 36 of that Act, an ultra vires contract concluded by a 
director was not void only as a consequence of the company‟s lack of capacity, or 
the director‟s lack of authority arising from such lack of capacity. Such a contract 
would be valid and enforceable. However, the internal consequences of the ultra vir-
es doctrine survived: the responsible directors incurred liability to the company for 
breaching a fiduciary duty, and the shareholders of the company could still have 
been entitled to restrain the directors from rendering performance in terms of the 
                                                          
23
 See In Re Horsley & Weight Ltd [1982] 3 ALL ER 1045 (CA) 1050-1. 
24
 Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 163. 
25
 Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co v Riche (1875) LR 7 HL 653. See also Cassim FHI „The 
Rise, Fall and Reform of the Ultra Vires Doctrine‟ (1998) 10 SA Merc LJ 293. 
26
 See Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 166-7. The prob-
lems and failures of the ultra vires doctrine will be discussed in Chapter Three.  
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contract.27 The relaxed approach of the 1973 Act to the ultra vires doctrine continues 
to apply in the new company law dispensation.28 In fact, the 2008 Act further dis-
tances South African company law from the ultra vires doctrine by expressly stating 
that a company has the same contractual capacity and powers as a natural person.29  
1.6.4.2 The doctrine of constructive notice 
The doctrine of constructive notice is a rule of company law that has traditionally 
been available to a company to protect itself from being bound to ultra vires con-
tracts entered into by the company‟s directors and other agents. Under the applica-
tion of this doctrine, third parties dealing with a company were effectively deemed to 
be aware of the contents of the public documents of the company, whether they had 
read those documents or not.30 The doctrine of constructive notice has attracted se-
vere criticism over the years for its harsh effects on outsiders dealing with compa-
nies.31 
The 2008 Act has to a large extent abolished the doctrine of constructive notice.32 
However, it has made provision for the resurrection of the doctrine in two specific in-
stances. In the first instance, outsiders are deemed to have knowledge of the joint 
and several liability of directors of personal liability companies.33 Secondly, s 19(5)(a) 
of the Act stipulates that all persons must be regarded as having notice and 
knowledge of any restrictive condition in a company‟s MOI, provided the company‟s 
name includes the term “RF” at the end of its name, and the Notice of Incorporation 
or a subsequent Notice of Amendment draws proper attention to the relevant provi-
sion.34 The expression “RF” is intended to alert outsiders dealing with a company to 
                                                          
27
 See Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 170 and 172. 
28
 In terms of s 20(1)(a)(i) of the 2008 Act. 
29
 In terms of s 19(1)(b) of the 2008 Act. See 3.5.1 herein. This is an approach long adopted in re-
spect of close corporations. See s 2(4) of the Close Corporation Act 69 of 1984. 
30
 Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 179. 
31
 Particularly, by Professor JS McLennan. See McLennan JS „Time for the Final Abolition of the Ultra 
Vires and Constructive Notice Doctrines in Company Law‟ (1997) 9 SA Merc LJ 333. 
32
 Section 19(4) of the 2008 Act expressly states that subject to s 19(5), a person must not be regard-
ed as having received notice or knowledge of the contents of any document relating to a company 
merely because the document has been filed or is accessible for inspection at an office of the compa-
ny. 
33
 See s 19(3) read with s 19(5)(b) of the 2008 Act. FHI Cassim comments that the rationale for this 
provision is not completely clear. See Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand 
Rule‟ (2012) at 181.  
34
 Section 11(3) read with ss 13(3), 15(2)(b), and 19(5)(a) of the 2008 Act. 
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the fact that the company‟s powers are restricted in some way, thereby encouraging 
them to examine the company‟s MOI to determine precisely what the limitation is.  
Unfortunately, the phrase „restrictive conditions applicable to the company‟ contained 
in s 15(2)(b) of the Act remains undefined.35 To dispel the growing confusion, the 
CIPC issued Practice Note 4 of 2012, which aimed to clear up the uncertainty re-
garding precisely under which circumstances the expression should be affixed to a 
company‟s name. 
1.7 Theoretical assumptions and delimitation of study area 
Due to the constraints of the word limit of this mini-thesis, a comprehensive exposi-
tion of unauthorised agency in company law will not be possible. Certain areas of 
this problem are simply impossible to address here. 
It shall be assumed that the company was named and in existence at the time of 
conclusion of the unauthorised contract, and that the agent‟s lack of authority is not 
due to non-compliance with an internal formality of the company for the validity of 
such a contract.36 This thesis will only cursorily discuss the liability of the agent to-
wards the company for acting in excess of his authority.37  
1.8 Research methodology 
This thesis will not take the form of an empirical study. Instead, this thesis will be a 
strictly desktop study. It is hoped that an analysis of relevant primary sources such 
as the provisions of the 1973 Act and of the 2008 Act, as well as of relevant foreign 
and domestic case law, will serve to lay a proper foundation for identifying the intri-
cate legal principles at play. To add depth to this thesis, the views on this topic of 
leading South African academics will also be consulted and critically discussed.   
                                                          
35
 MF Cassim rightly raises concern about the lack of certainty in this regard. See Cassim MF „For-
mation of Companies and the Company Constitution‟ in Cassim FHI (man.ed) et al Contemporary 
Company Law 2 ed (2012) at 130. 
36
 In such a case, s 20(7) of the 2008 Act and the common-law Turquand rule provide protection to 
bona fide third parties. See ss 20(7) and 20(8) of the 2008 Act. While the legal position created where 
the purported agent‟s lack of authority arose from the company‟s non-compliance with an internal 
formality for the existence of the agent‟s authority is without doubt a matter of great practical im-
portance and academic interest, it can unfortunately not be addressed in this thesis.  
37
 The 2008 Act, in ss 75-77, codifies certain of the common-law fiduciary duties of directors, and 
stipulates the consequences of their breach. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
AUTHORITY, AGENCY BY ESTOPPEL, AND RATIFICATION 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two will discuss the concept of authority and analyse the important role it 
plays in the phenomenon of representation. It is trite that the legal principles regulat-
ing the relationship between a company and its representatives are primarily those of 
the law of agency. However, company law rules (both statutory38 and those arising 
from the common law39) create an agency relationship with special characteristics. 
Yet, the fundamental principle remains that a person purporting to represent a com-
pany must have been duly authorised to do so, in order to effectively „create, alter or 
extinguish legal obligations‟ on the company‟s behalf.40 Therefore, it seems appro-
priate to commence the body of this thesis with an analysis of the concept of authori-
ty. 
Consideration will be given to the two manifestations of actual authority, express au-
thority and implied authority. Thereafter, this chapter will discuss the various sources 
of authority, to illustrate how one person may come to have the power to represent 
another.41 Finally, a reflection on the principles of ratification and agency by estoppel 
will illustrate the circumstances under which a person may be held liable, as princi-
pal, on an unauthorised contract.   
2.2 Authority required for successful representation 
Central to the principles of agency law in South Africa, is the requirement of the rep-
resentative‟s authority to act on his principal‟s behalf. In order for a representative to 
conclude a valid contract on behalf of another person, he must have the necessary 
authority to do so.42 A contract entered into by an agent, in excess of his actual au-
                                                          
38
 In terms of s 66(1) of the 2008 Act. 
39
 Like the doctrines of ultra vires and constructive notice.  
40
 See Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ in De Wet JC (founding ed) LAWSA vol1 Third Reissue 
(2014) para 126. 
41
 For the purpose of concluding juristic acts. 
42
 Ratification and agency by estoppel being the exceptions. See Dendy M „Agency and Representa-
tion‟ (2014) para 137. 
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thority, is void. FHI Cassim‟s description of authority as „the nub of agency‟ is there-
fore quite an appropriate one.43 
2.3 Types of authority 
Lord Denning‟s exposition of the two distinct forms of actual authority in Hely-
Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd & another44  has been relied upon and approved by 
South African courts on multiple occasions.45 There is only one type of authority rec-
ognised in South African law: actual authority. Actual authority can manifest in one of 
two ways: express authority or implied authority. Express authority is that authority 
explicitly given by the principal to the agent, either verbally or in writing. The confer-
ring of authority may also be implied from the conduct of the parties and other sur-
rounding circumstances.46 In conjunction with his express authority, an agent may 
have the implied authority to do whatever is reasonably necessary for, or incidental 
to, the performance of the obligation/s with which the express authority is coupled.47  
2.4 Sources of authority 
It is necessary, at the outset, to state that the juristic nature of the various sources of 
authority remains in doubt. The two academic heavyweights of contract and agency 
law in South Africa, Professors JC De Wet and AJ Kerr, grappled with opposing ends 
of this proverbial stick.48  Dendy attempts to resolve the dispute in the latest re-issue 
                                                          
43
 Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency, and the Turquand Rule‟ in Cassim FHI (man.ed) et al 
Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) at 187. 
44
 [1968] 1 QB 549 (CA); [1967] 3 All ER 98. 
45
 See NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd and Others 2002 (1) SA 396 (SCA) [2002] 2 All SA 
262 para 24; Northern Metropolitan Local Council v Company Unique Finance (36/11) [2012] ZASCA 
66 (21 May 2012) para 24. In Hely-Hutchinson, Lord Denning stated: „[Actual authority] is express 
when it is given by express words, such as when a board of directors pass a resolution which author-
ises two of their number to sign cheques. It is implied when it is inferred from the conduct of the par-
ties and the circumstances of the case, such as when the board of directors appoint one of their num-
ber to be managing director. They thereby impliedly authorise him to do all such things as fall within 
the usual scope of that office. Actual authority, express or implied, is binding as between the company 
and the agent, and also as between the company and others, whether they are within the company or 
outside it‟. 
46
 It could thus be argued that there are in fact three manifestations of actual authority: authority ex-
pressly given, authority tacitly “given”, and authority implied by virtue of the task/s needing to be per-
formed on the principal‟s behalf. See Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ (2014) para 142 for a 
concise and thoughtful discussion of the concept of actual authority. 
47
 Provided that the agent cannot have the implied authority to do something which is clearly beyond 
his express authority, for example where an express limitation is placed on his authority. See Dendy 
M „Agency and Representation‟ (2014) 142. 
48
 See Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ (2014) para 139 for a succinct analysis of the debate. 
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of „Agency & Representation‟.49 What can be regarded as certain and accepted law 
regarding the creation of authority will be set out below.  
In the usual course of events, an agent will derive his authority from authorisation by 
his principal. The authorisation consists of an expression of the principal‟s will, by 
words or by conduct, that the agent be empowered to conclude a juristic act on the 
principal‟s behalf.50 The authorisation will more often than not be obligated by or in-
cidental to, and evidenced by, a contract.51 This contract between the principal and 
his agent will usually be one of mandate.52   
However, representative capacity may also be established through operation of law. 
The following examples are illustrative of this point: 
(i) A parent or guardian of a minor child is authorised to act on the minor‟s be-
half; and 
(ii) Mentally ill persons and prodigals are represented by curators with ex lege 
authority to act on their behalf.53 
Immediately noticeable in the above scenarios, is the absence of the principal‟s wish 
to enter into an agency relationship.54 It is submitted that a further distinction be-
tween authority conferred by authorisation and authority arising from operation of law 
lies in the ease with which the principal can revoke the authority. If authority has 
been conferred on an agent by way of authorisation, the principal is generally free to 
                                                          
49
 Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ (2014) para 139. 
50
 Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ (2014) para 142. 
51
 See Corbett JA‟s dictum in Joel Melamed and Hurwitz v Cleveland Estates (Pty) Ltd; Joel Melamed 
and Hurwitz  v Vorner Investments (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 155 (A). At para 121 the learned judge of 
appeal writes: „An act of representation needs to be authorised by the principal. Such authorisation is 
usually contained in a contract.‟ Whether authorisation in such circumstances is a unilateral or bilat-
eral juristic act is, it is respectfully submitted, far from settled. See Dendy M „Agency and Representa-
tion‟ (2014) para 139. 
52
 Indeed, „[a]gency has always been associated with mandate for unstated but obvious reasons‟. See 
Joubert DJ „Agency and Stipulatio Alteri‟ in Zimmermann R & Visser D (eds) et al Southern Cross: 
Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 352. A typical example would be the relationship 
between an attorney and his client. Before proceeding to act on the client‟s behalf, the attorney should 
have the client sign a “power of attorney” as evidence of the attorney‟s authority. Included in this 
“power of attorney” however, will be an instruction to the attorney to perform certain acts (factual 
and/or juristic) on the client‟s behalf. In such a case, the attorney‟s instruction, embodied in the “power 
of attorney”, constitutes a mandate. See also Benson and Another v Walters and Others [1984] 1 ALL 
SA 283 (A), where Van Heerden JA at 287 remarked that „[i]t is clear that the relationship of an attor-
ney and his client is based on mandatum‟. Kerr correctly points out that the contract need not neces-
sarily be one of mandate; authority can also be conferred as a result of the conclusion of an employ-
ment contract, for example. See Kerr AJ The Law of Agency 4 ed (2006) 33.  
53
 These examples should by no means be considered to be a closed list. 
54
 As a general rule. 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
unilaterally revoke the agent‟s authority at any time.55 In contrast, the authority of a 
parent, guardian or curator cannot unilaterally be revoked by his ward; nothing but a 
court order can remove such authority.56  
2.5 Agency by estoppel  
One often hears it said that an agent is clothed with “ostensible authority”.57 Howev-
er, “ostensible authority” is no authority at all. This phrase is merely used to describe 
a situation where it appears to third parties that a purported agent has been properly 
authorised to contract on behalf of a professed principal. In certain circumstances, 
estoppel may become available to hold a professed principal liable on an unauthor-
ised contract. In simple terms, estoppel is a remedy aimed at preventing a person 
from benefitting from his own misrepresentation, however honest it may have been.58 
It operates in an agency context as follows: a prejudiced third party who was induced 
into contracting with an unauthorised agent by some conduct of a professed princi-
pal, may rely in legal proceedings on the equitable remedy of agency by estoppel to 
hold the professed principal to the contract, provided certain requirements have been 
met. The Supreme Court of Appeal has in a number of decisions restated the re-
quirements for reliance on agency by estoppel.59 In order for a third party to enforce 
a claim against a professed principal based on the “ostensible authority” of a pur-
ported agent, the following elements must be present: 
(i) A representation by words or conduct; 
(ii) The representation was made by the professed principal that the purported 
agent was authorised to act as he had done; 
(iii) The representation was of such a form that the professed principal should 
reasonably have expected outsiders to act on the strength of it; 
                                                          
55
 The existence of a truly irrevocable authority in South African law remains doubtful. See Dendy M 
„Agency and Representation‟ (2014) para 149. Indeed, the jurisprudential recognition of “irrevocable 
authority” found in, inter alia, Natal Bank v Natorp 1908 TS 1016, Ward v Barret 1962 (4) SA 732 (N), 
and Mattioda Construction (Pty) Ltd v Ritchie Bros Auctioneers 2007JOL 20858 (D), postulates a rea-
soning which is capable of criticism. See Kotze GF Die Leerstuk van Onherroeplike Volmag in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Verteenwoordigingsreg (unpublished LLM thesis, Stellenbosch University, 1985).   
56
 At least during the period in which the authority is intended to exist. When a minor attains the age of 
majority, for example, the authority of his parent or guardian lapses without the need for the minor to 
revoke it.   
57
 See Northern Metropolitan para 3. 
58
 Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 189. 
59
 NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce (Pty) Ltd and Others 2002 (1) SA 396 (SCA) para 26; Glofinco v 
Absa Bank t/a United Bank [2002] ZASCA 91 para 12, South African Broadcasting Corporation v Co-
op and Others [2005] ZASCA 118 para 66; Northern Metropolitan para 28.   
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(iv) The third party was induced by the representation into concluding the un-
authorised contract; 60 
(v) The third party‟s reliance was reasonable in the circumstances; and 
(vi) The third party suffered prejudice as a result. 
If the above factual requirements have been met, the professed principal will be es-
topped (prevented) from denying the existence of the purported agent‟s authority. 
Consequently, the professed principal will be bound to the unauthorised contract as 
if the purported agent had been duly authorised to conclude it. 
Since “apparent authority” is no authority at all, in the interest of accurate terminolo-
gy, it is submitted that the description “agency by estoppel” should be preferred.61 
2.6 Ratification 
It often happens that, despite the professed principal's ire at his agent for contracting 
beyond his authority, he nevertheless wishes to accept the rights and obligations 
which would have arisen had the would-be agent been properly authorised. In such 
circumstances, the professed principal may elect to abide by an unauthorised con-
tract through ratification.  
Ratification is the subsequent validation of a previously unauthorised contract con-
cluded by a purported agent on a professed principal‟s behalf. Ratification is a uni-
lateral juristic act by the professed principal, entailing an expression of his will that he 
shall assume the liabilities under the unauthorised contract. The effect of ratification 
is to have the unauthorised contract be regarded as if it had been authorised at the 
time of its conclusion.62 
2.7 Conclusion 
The common-law principles regarding authority, ratification and agency by estoppel 
are of fundamental importance in commercial dealings, no less so where the princi-
pal is a company. Since the existence of a director‟s authority now flows directly from 
                                                          
60
 See Strachan v Blackbeard and Son 1910 AD 282 at 288-9. 
61
 Cf Kerr AJ The Law of Agency (2006) 25-31. Unfortunately, Mpati P in Northern Metropolitan‟s case 
referred to the “ostensible authority” of the appellant throughout. 
62
 See Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ (2014) paras 150-1.  
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the 2008 Act,63 a proper understanding of the law of agency is vital when determin-
ing the extent to which a company can be bound to unauthorised contracts. 
Chapter Three will analyse the validity of unauthorised company contracts in light of 
the provisions of the 2008 Act.   
  
                                                          
63
 In terms of s 66(1) of the 2008 Act. See 4.2 below. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
THE VALIDITY OF UNAUTHORISED COMPANY CONTRACTS  
3.1 Introduction 
A company is a fictitious person. As such, it is unable to speak or act for itself. 
Therefore, representatives must be appointed to speak and act on a company‟s be-
half.64 The archaic notion that a company‟s contractual capacity is limited to achiev-
ing its main object as set out in the company‟s public documents has presented 
great difficulties in commerce. These antiquated ideas arose in the early days of 
company law, at a time when no corporate veil separated a company from its mem-
bers. Besides restricting commercial activity, the idea of a company possessing only 
limited contractual capacity was also the cause of a considerable amount of com-
plexity in company law jurisprudence as a whole.65  
Despite legislative reform aimed at simplifying the company law regime and provid-
ing greater protection for third parties,66 it remains the case that no straightforward 
answer exists to the question of what the legal position is if a company‟s agent con-
cludes an unauthorised contract with an outsider. This state of affairs is far from ide-
al, as company law has a particularly important role to play in any economy, and 
therefore needs to be clear and certain.67 
In order to appreciate the contemporary approach to corporate capacity, regard must 
be had to the historical operation of the common-law doctrines of ultra vires and 
constructive notice, in conjunction with the effect of relevant provisions of the 1973 
                                                          
64
 These representatives include the company‟s authorised directors and agents. Section 69 of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 (the 1973 Act) rather superfluously restated the common law in this regard 
by requiring company contracts to be concluded by persons authorised to contract on behalf of the 
company in order for them to be valid. Section 66(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the 2008 Act) 
stipulates that a company‟s business and affairs must be managed by or under the direction of the 
board of directors, and confers on the board the authority to „exercise all of the powers and perform 
any of the functions of the company‟ (within the limits of the company‟s MOI and of the Act itself). The 
authority to perform the functions of the company should include the authority to bind the company to 
contracts. See 4.2 herein.  
65
 On the ultra vires doctrine, Professor McLennan writes: „[T]his topic has perhaps received more 
judicial and academic attention than any of the numerous other controversial topics in the field of 
company law‟. See McLennan JS „The Ultra Vires Doctrine and the Turquand Rule in company law – 
A Suggested Solution‟ (1979) 96 SALJ 329 at 329. FHI Cassim agrees that the ultra vires doctrine 
has had a profound impact on corporate law thinking. See Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency 
and the Turquand Rule‟ Cassim FHI (man.ed) et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) at 163.  
66
 In the forms of first the 1973 Act and its amendments, followed by the 2008 Act, as amended. 
67
 See Baiketlile L Corporate Capacity and Authority of Agents under the Botswana Companies Act 
2003 (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Cape Town, 2014) at 10. 
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Act.68 To that end, this chapter will reflect on the commercial and legal problems en-
countered as a result of these two antiquated doctrines, as well as on the legislative 
measures taken to halt their ever-increasing abuse. 
For the purpose of this thesis, two “types” of unauthorised company contracts must 
be distinguished: the first is a purported company contract which exceeds the con-
tractual capacity of the company (an ultra vires contract), and the second is a pur-
ported company contract entered into by an agent acting beyond the limits of his ac-
tual authority (a pure unauthorised contract). In this chapter, the effect of the relevant 
provisions of the 2008 Act on the validity of both of these types of unauthorised con-
tracts will be discussed.  
The 2008 Act has radically altered the South African company law approach to the 
issue of a company‟s contractual capacity. In short, two categories of companies 
have now been created: non-“RF” companies, which have nearly unlimited contrac-
tual capacity, and “RF” companies, whose capacity is limited in some way by the 
company‟s MOI. This chapter will enquire into the validity of both types of unauthor-
ised contracts concluded between an outsider and an agent of both categories of 
companies.  
3.2 The common-law position prior to the 1973 Act 
3.2.1 The doctrine of ultra vires  
Historically,69 in order to create a legally valid contract between a company and an-
other person, it was necessary to comply with two key requirements:70 the company 
had to have had the contractual capacity to enter into the agreement, and the com-
pany‟s representative had to have had the necessary authority to bind the compa-
ny.71 If either of these two requirements were lacking, the purported contract would 
be a nullity.72  
                                                          
68
 See Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 163. 
69
 Before 1 January 1974, the commencement date of the 1973 Act.  
70
 In addition to the common-law requirements for validity of a contract. See Naudé SJ „Company 
Contracts: The Effect of Section 36 of the New Act‟ (1974) 91 SALJ 315 at 315; Cassim FHI „Corpo-
rate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 163. 
71
 Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 163; Naudé SJ (1974) 
315. The second requirement is an established common-law rule of agency. See 2.2 above. 
72
 For either one or both of two reasons: lack of capacity on the part of the company, and/or lack of 
authority on the part of the representative. 
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For many years, the contractual capacity of South African companies was restricted. 
A company‟s main business was, in the past, required to be stipulated in a “main ob-
jects” clause contained in the company‟s MOA. The stated main object of a company 
was the cornerstone upon which all the company‟s business dealings were done, as 
the main object of the company determined its contractual capacity. The company 
would be limited to concluding contracts related to or reasonably incidental to that 
main object.73 Any contract concluded outside of that limited scope was void ab ini-
tio, and was incapable of ratification by the shareholders of the company.74 This be-
came known as the ultra vires doctrine.75 
The foundation of the ultra vires doctrine rested on the fact that companies were re-
garded to exist only for the purpose of concluding contracts related to or aimed at 
achieving their main object.76 A company‟s legal existence was thought to be limited 
to concluding only those contracts that furthered the company‟s main object, or at 
the very least contracts which were ancillary or reasonably incidental to the compa-
ny‟s main object.77 Contracts aimed at achieving a purpose unrelated to the compa-
ny‟s main object simply could not be valid.78  
It should be borne in mind that a company‟s contractual capacity and the authority of 
its agents to act on the company‟s behalf are inextricably linked – if a company‟s 
main object limited its contractual capacity to achieving purpose X, the representa-
tives of the company could never have the authority to conclude a contract aimed at 
achieving purpose Y.79 Therefore, an ultra vires contract is also an unauthorised con-
tract.  
For more than a hundred years, the ultra vires doctrine has plagued South African 
company law, complicating transactions between companies and outsiders. In sim-
ple terms, the ultra vires doctrine prohibits a company from entering into an agree-
ment beyond its legitimate powers. Any purported contract concluded on behalf of a 
                                                          
73
 See In Re Horsley & Weight Ltd [1982] 3 ALL ER 1045 (CA) 1050-1. 
74
 A principle established in Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co v Riche (1875) LR 7 HL 653. See 
Cassim FHI „The Rise, Fall and Reform of the Ultra Vires Doctrine‟ (1998) 293 . 
75
 The literal translation of the phrase „ultra vires‟ is „beyond the powers‟. See http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/ultra+vires (accessed on 13 August 2015). 
76
 See Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 163 and 165. 
77
 See Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 163 note 3. 
78
 Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 163. See also McLen-
nan JS (1979), where the learned author at 330 note 11 cites Hompes v Beaumont Estate Co Ltd 
1903 TS 227 as an early example of the ultra vires doctrine being applied in South African law. 
79
 Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 165. 
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company dealing with matters outside of the limited scope of the company‟s main 
object as stated in its MOA, was void ab initio due to the company‟s lack of capacity. 
Consequently, no party to an ultra vires company contract could enforce perfor-
mance according to its terms.80 
FHI Cassim distinguishes between the external and the internal consequences of an 
ultra vires contract.81 Externally, i.e. between the company and the third party, the 
ultra vires doctrine renders the purported contract void and unenforceable. In any 
subsequent dispute that may arise, either party may rely on the fact that the contract 
is beyond the capacity of the company and therefore void and unenforceable. The 
internal consequence of an ultra vires contract was twofold: the shareholders were 
entitled to prohibit the company from concluding or performing in terms of an ultra 
vires contract,82 and the company would have been entitled to hold the responsible 
director liable for any loss sustained by the company as a result of the unauthorised 
action, on the basis of a breach of the director‟s fiduciary duty not to act in excess of 
his actual authority.83 
The ultra vires doctrine was codified in the first legislative attempt to regulate South 
African company law. Section 6 of the Companies Act 46 of 1926 stipulated that a 
company that acted beyond the limits of the objects contained in its MOA acted ultra 
vires, and confirmed that such acts were void ab initio and incapable of ratification. In 
the event that an ultra vires contract was concluded between a company and a third 
party, the invalidity of the contract would preclude either party from enforcing its 
terms, and any performance made in terms of the void contract was to be returned.  
The traditional justification put forth for the ultra vires doctrine was that it served the 
important purpose of protecting the interests of a company‟s creditors and share-
holders.84 It was argued that the ultra vires doctrine served as a guarantee to both 
current and prospective shareholders that „an investor in a gold mining company did 
                                                          
80
 Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 165. 
81
 See Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 165-6. 
82
 In practice, the shareholders were entitled to apply for an interdict restraining the company from 
acting ultra vires. See McLennan JS (1979) 330; Naudé SJ (1974) 316.  
83
 See Cullerne v London and Suburban General Permanent Building Society (1890) 25 QBD 485. 
See also McLennan JS (1979) 331.  
84
 Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 164; McLennan JS 
(1979) 331; Blackman MS „The capacity, powers and purposes of companies: the Commission and 
the new Companies Act‟ (1975) 8 CILSA 1 at 2. 
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not find himself holding shares in a fried-fish shop‟.85 In addition, the ultra vires doc-
trine ostensibly safeguarded the interest of creditors to have the company‟s capital 
remain within the realms of the company‟s main object.86 It should be noted that the-
se grounds of justification have not found much support among contemporary com-
pany law academics.87 But however advantageous the ultra vires doctrine may have 
been for the company and its insiders, it would always operate to the detriment of 
third parties wishing to contract with the company. Indeed, the possibility of causing 
prejudice to outsiders is an almost inevitable consequence of the ultra vires doctrine. 
This risk was thought to be justified by the fact that a company‟s public documents 
were available for inspection by outsiders wishing to contract with it; it was argued 
that outsiders were therefore in a position to protect themselves by determining a 
company‟s contractual capacity before contracting with it.88 This argument prima fa-
cie has merit, until one considers how well-equipped outsiders actually would have 
been to read and understand a company‟s public documents. A company‟s MOA and 
AOA would often have been voluminous documents filled with company manage-
ment jargon and, as will be discussed below,89 could quite easily not even have re-
flected the true contractual capacity of the company.   
Therefore, the traditional ultra vires doctrine, coupled with the company‟s main ob-
ject, effectively operated as a guarantee for insiders that the company‟s finances 
would not be used for a purpose other than the purpose for which the company had 
been formed.90 In this regard, the ultra vires doctrine was tremendously successful. 
However, it cannot be denied that restrictions on a company‟s contractual capacity 
would always place third parties at great risk. Indeed, ensuring greater protection for 
outsiders transacting with companies was among the chief reasons for the Legisla-
ture‟s introduction of s 36 of the 1973 Act.91  
 
                                                          
85
 See Gower et al Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law 4 ed (1979) 165; Cassim FHI (1998) 
295. 
86
 Cassim FHI (1998) 295. 
87
 See McLennan JS (1979) 331. Blackman suggests that the practical usefulness of the ultra vires 
doctrine may have been exaggerated because of its important role in corporate theory. See Blackman 
MS (1975) 1. 
88
 See Blackman MS (1975) 2. 
89
 At 3.3.1. 
90
 McLennan JS (1979) 331.  
91
 McLennan JS (1979) 334. 
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3.2.2 The doctrine of constructive notice 
The doctrine of constructive notice is a company law rule that supplemented the ultra 
vires doctrine and greatly impacted on the potential liability of companies for unau-
thorised contracts concluded on their behalf. Under the application of this doctrine, 
all outsiders dealing with a company were effectively deemed to be aware of the 
contents of that company‟s public documents lying open for public inspection at the 
office of the Registrar of Companies,92 whether they had read them or not.93 These 
public documents included the MOA and the AOA, as well as any special resolutions 
passed by the company.  
However, to say that the doctrine of constructive notice deemed outsiders to have 
knowledge of the contents of a company‟s public documents is a potentially mislead-
ing statement, as it would imply that an outsider contracting with a company could 
rely on a provision in the company‟s public documents despite not knowing about the 
provision at the relevant time.94 This was never the position. Professor McLennan 
correctly summarises the effect of the constructive notice doctrine as follows: 
„[T]he doctrine is more accurately expressed by saying that a person dealing with a 
company cannot rely on his ignorance of the contents of the public documents than 
by saying that he is deemed to have knowledge of them‟.95 
This judge-made rule operated to prevent outsiders dealing with a company from as-
serting that they did not have knowledge of the contents of the company‟s public 
documents. The legal fiction created by the doctrine of constructive notice has al-
ways been justified by the argument that the public documents of the company have 
been made available for inspection by the public, who should guide themselves by 
their contents.96 Of course, this publicity of a company‟s documents was required by 
                                                          
92
 Now the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission. 
93
 A rule laid down in Ernest v Nicholls (1857) 6 HL CAS 401. 
94
 McLennan JS (1979) 342.  
95
 McLennan JS (1979) 343. 
96
 Thus, Professor McLennan writes: „This publicity is the underlying basis of the doctrine of construc-
tive notice.‟ McLennan JS (1979) 342. The publication of the MOA and the AOA was required by the 
doctrine of disclosure. See Delport P „Companies Act 71 of 2008 and the “Turquand Rule”‟ (2011) 
THRHR 74 132 at 133. 
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the doctrine of disclosure, which ran like a golden thread throughout company law 
prior to the 2008 Act.97 
The doctrine of constructive notice was never intended to benefit any other party ex-
cept the company, and would always operate against outsiders. This much-criticised 
company law rule was fashioned solely for the protection of a company‟s interests, 
and could only be utilised by a company to defend itself; it was never intended to be 
available to insiders to protect themselves.98 The doctrine of constructive notice was 
a rule allowing companies to defend themselves from unwanted liability, not one im-
puting knowledge upon others where none had previously existed. In this regard, 
Slade J in Rama Corporation Ltd v Proved Tin & General Investments Ltd99 put forth 
a concise summation of the true position: 
„[T]he doctrine of constructive notice of a company‟s registered documents…does not 
operate against a company, but only in its favour. Put in the converse way, the doc-
trine of constructive notice operates against the person who fails to inquire, but does 
not operate in his favour. There is no positive doctrine of constructive notice, only a 
negative one‟.100 
The fact that all outsiders were prohibited from claiming ignorance of the contents of 
a company‟s public documents was capable of having important and far-reaching 
consequences.101 Since a company‟s objects clause was contained in a public doc-
ument, outsiders dealing with that company were effectively deemed to have 
knowledge of the extent of the company‟s contractual capacity. Therefore, if a com-
pany‟s representative concluded an ultra vires contract on the company‟s behalf, the 
third party would in any subsequent legal proceedings be prevented from alleging 
that he was unaware that the company had been acting in excess of its powers. This 
illustrates how the doctrine of constructive notice supplemented the ultra vires doc-
trine. No outsider could have relied on his ignorance of a company‟s lack of capacity 
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to enforce an ultra vires contract, as the doctrine of constructive notice would have 
prevented him from doing so.102 Even a bona fide third party with no prior knowledge 
that a particular contract was beyond the stated powers of the company, would not 
have been able to rely on his ignorance to validate the ultra vires contract. Therefore, 
to protect themselves, outsiders dealing with companies would have had to read the 
company‟s public documents in order to determine the company‟s main object, and 
thereby its contractual capacity. The doctrine of constructive notice has been severe-
ly criticised for placing this burden on third parties, in that outsiders dealing with 
companies would have been forced to read that company‟s public documents to en-
sure that no problematic capacity or authority issues would arise after the conclusion 
of the transaction.103 The doctrine failed to take into consideration the fact that even 
if every outsider would take the time to read a company‟s public documents, such 
reading would not guarantee that the outsider fully understood them.104  
Constructive notice of a company‟s public documents had a further adverse impact 
on outsiders. While it is evident that the doctrine of constructive notice mainly served 
as an excellent enforcer of the ultra vires doctrine, it also impacted greatly on the va-
lidity of pure unauthorised contracts.105 As discussed above,106 the principles of 
agency law regulate the relationship between a company and its representatives. To 
provide a more specific structure to the general agency relationship, the authority of 
a company‟s representatives would usually have been set out (and often limited) in 
that company‟s AOA. Therefore, the doctrine of constructive notice would deem an 
outsider dealing with a company to know the scope of the company representative‟s 
authority when dealing with him, if the extent of that authority was reflected in a pub-
lic document of the company. The consequence of this is that the third party would 
not have been able to rely on agency by estoppel to enforce the agreement, even if 
the company had held the purported agent out as having the necessary authority. If, 
for example, a company in its AOA expressly excluded or limited the authority of one 
of its representatives, and that representative then concluded a pure unauthorised 
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contract, the fact that the outsider was prevented from claiming ignorance of the limi-
tation in the AOA would have created an insurmountable difficulty for him to hold the 
company to the contract on the basis of agency by estoppel. FHI Cassim correctly 
points out that the doctrine of constructive notice „could destroy the third party‟s pro-
spects of relying on the ostensible authority of the directors‟.107 This is so because 
the third party cannot be said to have been guided or misled by a company‟s repre-
sentation that an agent had the necessary authority to bind the company, if the third 
party “knows” that such representation is false.108 The doctrine of constructive notice 
would preclude the third party from even asserting in legal proceedings that he was 
ignorant of the purported agent‟s lack of authority. If the third party was not induced 
by the company‟s representation of authority (if any existed), then agency by estop-
pel could not have been available to him.109 In this regard, it has been argued that 
the doctrine of constructive notice went too far in protecting the company at the ex-
pense of outsiders.110 The risk of a contract failing due to the representative‟s lack of 
authority,111 coupled with the prohibition on asserting ignorance of such lack of au-
thority, effectively compelled outsiders (if they were prudent) to examine a compa-
ny‟s public documents each time before they entered into an agreement with it – a 
rather onerous burden.112 
Despite the criticism of the doctrine of constructive notice and the repeated calls for 
its abolishment,113 this archaic company law rule continued to apply under the 1973 
Act. South African company law seemed unwilling to rid itself of the malicious doc-
trine of constructive notice.   
3.2.3 The failure of the doctrines of ultra vires and constructive notice 
The failings of the problematic company law doctrines of ultra vires and constructive 
notice are well documented, and therefore need only briefly be summarised here. 
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The theoretical justification of the ultra vires doctrine has often been questioned and 
criticised for lacking a sound basis. Blackman argues that the doctrine was wholly 
unpractical as it placed an undesirable restriction on the profitability of companies.114 
Shareholders were prevented from adopting potentially profitable contracts merely 
because they were ultra vires the company. Furthermore, a company‟s creditors 
were just as likely to be prejudiced by the ultra vires doctrine as they were to be pro-
tected by it.115 It should therefore have come as no surprise that companies would 
look to use any available means to release themselves from the shackles of the ultra 
vires doctrine. 
It is by now notorious how the ultra vires doctrine was effectively nullified by the 
abuse of the objects clause. For various reasons, including business efficacy and 
commercial freedom, the traditional ultra vires doctrine was circumvented by crafty 
drafting techniques aimed at bestowing on a company any and every conceivable 
business it could possibly pursue.116 Drafters of company memoranda began to draft 
their objects clauses as widely as possible, in an effort to include all potential busi-
ness activities.117 The result of this practice was that companies would enjoy the ca-
pacity to pursue practically any lawful business and conclude any type of contract.118 
Academics have long noted how the ultra vires doctrine „led to a prolixity of objects 
and powers in the typical company‟s memorandum‟.119 However, such widely-drafted 
objects clauses would always present a potential pitfall for unwary and ignorant out-
siders, while providing only superficial protection for the company‟s members.120  
As a result of the judicial recognition of “subjective objects” clauses121 and the broad 
“ancillary powers” granted by s 33(2) of the 1973 Act, it had become apparent that 
the classical ultra vires doctrine no longer existed. It was therefore of great disap-
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pointment to some that the doctrine of constructive notice remained a part of South 
African company law.122 Despite the reformulation of the ultra vires doctrine by the 
1973 Act, the doctrine of constructive notice continued to operate in respect of limita-
tions imposed on the authority of a company‟s representatives in the company‟s pub-
lic documents.123 Therefore, under the 1973 Act, an outsider‟s claim against a com-
pany in respect of a pure unauthorised contract could still have been negated by the 
harmful impact of the constructive notice doctrine.124 
Together, the ultra vires doctrine and the doctrine of constructive notice have proven 
to be an excellent shield for companies against unwanted liability. However, this pro-
tection would always be at the expense of outsiders dealing with the company. The 
inherent risk for outsiders contracting with a company‟s representatives surely con-
tributed to the frustration of commercial dealings. Fortunately, the confusion and 
frustration caused by these old-fashioned rules of company law eventually provided 
the impetus for change, both in South Africa and abroad.  
3.3 The 1973 Act 
A revolutionary change to the South African company law regime came with the in-
troduction of the 1973 Act. This Act completely reformulated the ultra vires doctrine 
and, as a consequence, drastically limited the application of the doctrine of construc-
tive notice.  
In furtherance of the doctrine of disclosure, s 63 of the 1973 Act required companies 
to lodge both an MOA and an AOA with the Registrar of Companies.125 Section 52(1) 
of the 1973 Act obligated companies to state in their MOA the main object for which 
they were incorporated, and to describe the main business for which the company 
had been formed. Section 33 stipulated that a company‟s contractual capacity would 
be limited to the stated main object and would include „unlimited objects ancillary to 
the said main object except such specific ancillary objects as are expressly excluded 
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in its memorandum‟. Section 34 of the 1973 Act further consolidated this position by 
bestowing “plenary powers” on companies to enable them to realise both their main 
and ancillary objects, provided such powers were not expressly excluded or qualified 
in the company‟s MOA. These sections of the 1973 Act were specifically aimed at 
halting the abuse of the ultra vires doctrine by unreasonably wide objects clauses in 
the MOAs of companies.126 By bestowing such broad powers on companies, the 
1973 Act also greatly reduced the impact of the ultra vires doctrine.  
In short, the effect of s 36 of the 1973 Act was to have all ultra vires company con-
tracts concluded by directors be regarded as valid.127 Section 36 provided that no act 
of a company would be void only because the company lacked the capacity to con-
clude it, or because the directors had no authority to conclude the transaction as a 
result of the company‟s lack of capacity. If s 36 of the 1973 Act found application, the 
most basic requirement for the validity of company contracts, namely that the con-
tract must be within the powers of the company, fell away.128  
To solidify the new approach, s 36 prohibited companies and outsiders from relying 
on the company‟s lack of capacity in any legal proceedings inter se.129 The idea was 
that since neither the company nor the third party could present evidence before a 
court regarding the company‟s lack of capacity to conclude a certain contact, the 
court would not have been able to take that fact into consideration when deciding on 
the contract‟s validity. Without proof of the company‟s lack of capacity, the court 
would have had to resolve the dispute as if the company did have the capacity to 
conclude the contract.130  
However, s 36 did allow for the company‟s lack of capacity to be relied on in legal 
proceedings between the company, its shareholders, and the errant director/s. In so 
doing, Parliament retained an important internal consequence of the ultra vires doc-
trine, namely the shareholders‟ right to restrain the company from concluding an ultra 
vires contract. In effect, s 36 of the 1973 Act also created a distinction between com-
pany contracts with outsiders and company contracts with insiders; the company‟s 
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capacity and the modified ultra vires doctrine would continue to affect the latter.131 
However, an important change brought about by s 36 was that once an ultra vires 
contract had been concluded, shareholders no longer had the right to restrain the 
company from performing according to its terms; the shareholders‟ restraining action 
under the 1973 Act seemed to be limited to prohibiting the conclusion of ultra vires 
contracts, but not their performance.132  
Section 36 of the 1973 Act would only find application where the directors of the 
company lacked the authority to conclude a company contract only because the 
company did not have the capacity to do so. The wording of s 36 made it clear that 
an ultra vires company contract would be valid only where the director that conclud-
ed it lacked authority as a direct result of the company‟s lack of capacity. If a pur-
ported company contract was unauthorised for a reason other than the company‟s 
lack of capacity, the contract remained void in accordance with the principles of the 
law of agency as discussed above.133 Therefore, for example, if a non-executive di-
rector purported to conclude a company contract where the AOA of the company 
stipulated that only the managing director could bind the company, s 36 could not 
have found application; such a contract would have been void not because it ex-
ceeded the company‟s capacity, but because the director did not have the authority 
to conclude it.  
Before the commencement date of the 1973 Act, both an ultra vires contract and a 
pure unauthorised contract were void ab initio and unenforceable. However, while a 
pure unauthorised contract was always capable of ratification by the company,134 an 
ultra vires contract, being an absolute nullity, could never be ratified even if all the 
shareholders of the company consented to it.135 Furthermore, agency by estoppel 
and the Turquand rule were available to enforce a pure unauthorised contract, but 
could never find application where a company had acted beyond its powers.136  
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Therefore, the most significant impact of the relevant sections of the 1973 Act on the 
validity of unauthorised company contracts, is that between 1 January 1974137 and 1 
May 2011, all ultra vires contracts concluded by directors were valid.  
3.3.1 Academic criticism of the arrangement under the 1973 Act 
Because s 20(1) of the 2008 Act is clearly intended to replace s 36 of the 1973 Act, 
and because the wording remains quite similar, it seems appropriate to briefly dis-
cuss the difficulties and inconsistencies encountered in the interpretation of the pre-
vious legislative arrangement.  
Despite Parliament‟s best intentions, s 36 of the 1973 Act was not a model of legisla-
tive clarity.138 The changes to the issue of corporate capacity brought about by s 36 
were subjected to concerned academic criticism since the enactment of the 1973 
Act. The provisions regulating the concepts of main objects, main business, and ple-
nary powers, were criticised for being too vague.139 In particular, s 33(2) was criti-
cised for having the odd effect of creating the legislative space for a situation where 
the main object as stated in a company‟s MOA could quite materially differ from the 
actual capacity of the company.140 Incongruously, the impact of these sections was 
to allow the contractual capacity of a company to change without notice, thereby en-
tirely negating the purpose of having a “main objects” clause.141 
A much-criticised limitation of s 36 was that it could only find application if it was a 
director that concluded the ultra vires contract.142 As Naudé notes, the wording of s 
36 of the 1973 Act could only be interpreted to mean that its protection would be-
come available only if it was a director, and not any other authorised representative, 
that concluded the ultra vires contract. Section 36 could only operate to validate an 
ultra vires contract if it was the directors of the company that had concluded it, there-
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by excluding from its ambit ultra vires company contracts concluded by duly author-
ised persons who were not directors, for example employees, mandataries, inde-
pendent contractors, or regular agents. Section 36 was therefore criticised for unduly 
limiting its own application.143 
As Naudé correctly points out, authority to represent a company need not necessari-
ly be conferred on directors alone; indeed, it is often the case that a company dele-
gates power to non-directors, for example employees and ad hoc mandataries, to act 
on its behalf.144 Naudé and McLennan were therefore particularly critical of the for-
mulation of s 36 for the following reason: it left the door open for the full force of the 
ultra vires doctrine to find application where a non-director company representative 
concluded an ultra vires contract. This position was certainly capable of being ex-
ploited by companies to the detriment of third parties, as it allowed a back-door es-
cape from liability for ultra vires company contracts.145 Despite s 36 not being appli-
cable to ultra vires company contracts concluded by authorised persons who were 
not directors, the principles of agency law would naturally remain applicable to the 
transaction. As discussed above,146 the capacity of a company and the authority of 
its representatives were always regarded as inseparable, in the sense that a compa-
ny's representative could never have the authority to perform acts which were be-
yond the capacity of the company. Therefore, if a non-director representative con-
cluded an ultra vires contract under the 1973 Act, the company would have been en-
titled to argue that the representative could not have been authorised to bind the 
company to a contract which exceeded the company‟s capacity. Since s 36 would 
probably not have found application, the common law would have prevailed to render 
the purported contract void. To make matters worse for the third party, the doctrine 
of constructive notice would have prevented him from asserting that he had had no 
knowledge of the company‟s main object as it appeared in the MOA. Since the 
shareholders could not have ratified the agreement, the outsider would have been 
left with a void contract. The potential for abuse of this loophole is clear: unscrupu-
lous companies could empower non-director representatives to conclude ultra vires 
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contracts, which the company could then legitimately back out of at a later stage.147 
Whether this type of abuse actually took place, however, is not known. Still, it is 
hardly desirable that such a lacuna existed.148 
Nothing in the wording of s 36 prohibited a third party who actually knew that he was 
contracting with a company in excess of the company‟s capacity, from holding the 
company to that contract anyway. Section 36 regarded as irrelevant the outsider‟s 
motives or knowledge that the company was acting ultra vires, leaving the door open 
for outsiders to enforce company contracts which they knew were outside of the 
company‟s capacity at the time of their conclusion.149 Worse still, ultra vires company 
contracts were valid even if both the directors and the third party who concluded it 
were fully aware of the company‟s lack of capacity.150 However, this type of abuse 
likely seldom occurred, or was even of any relevance, as the vague concepts of 
“main business” and “plenary powers” introduced by the 1973 Act served only to ex-
tend a company‟s powers further, making it nearly impossible for anyone to prove 
that a particular contract was beyond a company‟s capacity.151 In this regard, the 
1973 Act made great strides in eliminating the harsh effects of the ultra vires doctrine 
on outsiders.152  
The fact that the 1973 Act allowed for the company‟s lack of capacity to be relied on 
in legal proceedings between the company and its shareholders has also been sub-
jected to concerned criticism. Naudé argues that placing the directors on par with 
shareholders in this context may lead to inequitable results. He writes: 
„[I]t creates a situation where the validity of important contracts between companies 
may depend upon the insignificant shareholding of the one in the other for investment 
purposes. It is even conceivable that an abuse may take place: the holding of shares 
for the devious purpose of escaping from a contract at a later stage if the need to do 
so should arise‟.153 
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A company‟s directors are entrusted with the management of the company, and 
should therefore be expected to have greater knowledge of the company‟s capacity 
than the shareholders would have. In addition, one of the fiduciary duties of directors 
is the duty not to exceed their authority. Therefore, directors should have no cause 
for complaint if a company raised its own lack of capacity to avoid liability under an 
ultra vires contract between the company and a director, or to sue the directors for 
breaching their fiduciary duty not to exceed their authority. But perhaps potential in-
vestors guide themselves by other indicators than merely the company‟s constitutive 
documents. Yet, s 36 could have been invoked to invalidate a company contract 
merely because the outsider happened to be a shareholder of the company.154 Nau-
dé‟s argument is not without merit: it may have been unfair and unreasonable to pun-
ish a company‟s shareholders for ignorance of the company‟s stated main object, 
which in any event under the 1973 Act may not even have reflected the true capacity 
of the company.   
Since a company‟s capacity under the 1973 Act had for the most part become a non-
issue, outsiders would rarely have had cause or opportunity to argue ignorance of 
the company‟s capacity as set out in the main objects clause. By rendering the con-
tractual capacity of a company a largely irrelevant concept, s 36 considerably limited 
the application of the doctrine of constructive notice. Unfortunately for outsiders 
however, the doctrine of constructive notice was not completely abolished by the 
1973 Act. The outsider‟s deemed knowledge of the contents of a company‟s public 
documents continued to affect the validity of company contracts, at least in respect 
of the authority of a company‟s representatives as set out in the company‟s public 
documents.155 As was the case before the 1973 Act, outsiders dealing with a com-
pany would not have been able to claim ignorance of the provisions in a company‟s 
AOA regulating the authority of the company‟s representatives. Therefore, the doc-
trine of constructive notice continued to bar outsiders from relying on agency by es-
toppel to validate a pure unauthorised company contract concluded by an agent 
whose authority was curtailed in a public document of the company. In this regard, s 
36 was criticised for not going far enough.156  
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Another concern raised by Naudé was the possibility of s 36 being misused in a 
manner that would yet give effect to the traditional ultra vires doctrine. He noted that 
it was possible that a limitation on a company‟s contractual capacity could be en-
forced on outsiders by way of a carefully-worded curtailment of the authority of the 
company‟s directors. A company‟s AOA could, for example, state that the directors of 
the company were not authorised to conclude contracts beyond the company‟s ca-
pacity as determined by the main objects clause in the MOA. An ultra vires contract 
concluded by a director on that company‟s behalf would also have been a pure un-
authorised contract. Such a contract would arguably have been void despite s 36, for 
the director‟s lack of authority arose not only from the company‟s lack of capacity, 
but from the fact that his authority was expressly limited to concluding intra vires con-
tracts. Because the doctrine of constructive notice was not abolished by the 1973 
Act, the outsider would not have been able to claim ignorance of the limitation and 
enforce the contract by way of agency by estoppel. Such a clause in a company's 
AOA would effectively have enforced a company‟s contractual capacity against out-
siders, thereby defeating the purpose of s 36.  
Whatever its defects, it must be acknowledged that s 36 of the 1973 Act successfully 
removed most of the prejudicial impact of the ultra vires doctrine. Despite the criti-
cism of the arrangement under the 1973 Act, and the uncertainty regarding the inter-
pretation of s 36, no notable litigation arose on the subject. Therefore, the Legisla-
ture may have been forgiven for thinking that the legislation had achieved its aim, 
and for resisting the impulse to fix what was, by all appearances, working.157 As it 
transpired, however, Parliament saw fit to completely alter the legal position when it 
enacted the 2008 Act.  
3.4 The present position 
3.4.1 The contractual capacity of companies 
Parliament has, seemingly, through the enactment of s 19(1)(b) of the 2008 Act, 
completely abandoned the notion of the main object of a company (contained in a 
public document) determining the company‟s contractual capacity. Section 19(1)(b) 
boldly proclaims that a company now has:   
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„[A]ll the legal powers and capacity of an individual, except to the extent that –  
(i) a juristic person is incapable of exercising any such power, or having any 
such capacity; or  
(ii) the company‟s Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise‟.  
The effect of s 19(1)(b) is to bestow upon all companies practically the same con-
tractual capacity as natural persons, allowing them to conclude all types of contracts 
in connection with any lawful business that they choose to pursue.158 The second 
proviso to s 19(1)(b), which allows a company to derogate in its MOI from the broad 
contractual capacity provided to companies by the 2008 Act, provides the basis for 
the retention of certain aspects of the problematic ultra vires doctrine in South Afri-
can company law, in conjunction with a statutory reformulation of the common-law 
doctrine of constructive notice. 
3.4.2 The Memorandum of Incorporation  
To comply with the registration requirements under the 1973 Act,159 companies were 
required to lodge both their MOAs and AOAs with the Registrar of Companies. The 
2008 Act has altered this position: the MOI has replaced both the MOA and the AOA, 
and is now the sole governing document of South African companies.160 Both an 
MOI and a Notice of Incorporation must be lodged with the CIPC when incorporating 
a company.161 The MOI is intended to be the one document in which the rights, du-
ties and responsibilities of shareholders, directors, and all other relevant persons, 
are set out.162  
In contrast to the previous arrangement, a company‟s MOI will generally not be re-
garded as a public document, as there no longer seems to be a doctrine of construc-
tive notice.163 In fact, companies will no longer be required to have an objects clause 
in their MOIs at all. This should be welcomed, as it eliminates the unnecessary com-
                                                          
158
 The South African approach to the contractual capacity of companies is now in accord with com-
pany law legislation in, inter alia, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom. See 
Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 169. 
159
 Which were informed by the doctrine of disclosure. 
160
 See the definition of “Memorandum of Incorporation” in s 1 of the 2008 Act. See further Cassim 
FHI „Introduction to the New Companies Act‟ in Cassim FHI (man.ed) et al Contemporary Company 
Law 2 ed (2012) at 9.  
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 In terms of ss 13(1) and (2) of the 2008 Act. 
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 The fundamental restriction of the MOI is that its contents must be consistent with all the provisions 
of the 2008 Act. See s 15(1)(a) of the 2008 Act. 
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 As a result of s 19(4) of the 2008 Act.  
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plexity surrounding a company‟s contractual capacity that existed under the 1973 
Act.164 There is no longer any need for a company to set out its intended business 
activities in an objects clause, since companies are now free to pursue practically 
any business activity. However, a company‟s MOI may stipulate which business ac-
tivities the company intends not to pursue, by way of a restrictive condition limiting 
the powers of the company. Section 19(5)(a) of the 2008 Act states that all persons 
must be regarded as having received notice and knowledge of such provisions.165 To 
indicate to outsiders that the powers of the company are limited in some way, such a 
company must include the suffix “RF” behind its name.166  
Therefore, once a company has fulfilled the requirements stipulated by s19(5)(a) of 
the 2008 Act, thereby becoming an “RF” company, the provisions of its MOI in re-
spect of which the ring-fencing has been effected, must be regarded as “public pro-
visions”. Importantly, the statutory doctrine of constructive notice will apply to their 
contents.167 In an effort to create the necessary publicity for the doctrine to operate 
effectively, s 13(3) of the 2008 Act requires the “RF” company‟s Notice of Incorpora-
tion to „include a prominent statement drawing attention to each such provision, and 
its location in the Memorandum of Incorporation‟.  
The 2008 Act provides for certain “alterable” provisions, which apply automatically to 
a company unless excluded or amended in the company‟s MOI. An example of such 
an “alterable” provision is the required majority to adopt shareholder resolutions. In 
terms of s 65(10) of the 2008 Act, a provision in a company‟s MOI may require a dif-
ferent percentage of voting rights to the prescribed 75 per cent for the adoption of 
special resolutions.168 The possibility of opting-out of the standard 75 per cent is rel-
evant to the validity of both types of unauthorised contracts concluded on behalf of 
an “RF” company, as only a special resolution adopted by the company‟s sharehold-
ers may ratify „actions by the company or directors in excess of their authority‟.169  
The approach of the 2008 Act to the contents of a company‟s governing document is 
designed to promote flexibility regarding a company‟s internal rules; it allows a com-
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 See Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 169. See also 
3.3.1 herein. 
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 Subject to compliance with certain procedural requirements. See 3.4.3 below. 
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 The abbreviation “RF” means ring-fence. See Item 2 of Practice Note 4 of 2012. 
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 Out of necessity, the Turquand rule has also been retained. See ss 20(7) and (8) of the 2008 Act. 
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 Section 65(9) of the 2008 Act. 
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 For the purpose of s 20(2) of the 2008 Act. See s 65(11)(c) of the 2008 Act. 
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pany to better control its own operation through the inclusion of appropriate clauses 
in the MOI.170 An example of a clause which a company may insert in its MOI, which 
is of particular relevance to this thesis, is a provision that amounts to a “restrictive 
condition” for the purposes of s 15(2)(b) of the 2008 Act.  
3.4.3 The statutory doctrine of constructive notice 
Section 19(4) of the 2008 Act, at first glance, has finally abolished the doctrine of 
constructive notice in South African company law. It states: 
„Subject to subs (5), a person must not be regarded as having received notice or 
knowledge of the contents of any document relating to a company merely because 
the document has been filed or is accessible for inspection at an office of the compa-
ny.‟ 
This section has important implications for all companies in South Africa. By virtue of 
s 19(4), the very concept of a company‟s “public documents” has lost much of its le-
gal effect. For the most part, companies will no longer be able to raise against an 
outsider the outsider‟s deemed knowledge of the contents of the company‟s constitu-
tive documents. The new position will have vital consequences for all companies, 
particularly in the context of unauthorised agency. It means that an outsider will no 
longer be prevented from making use of agency by estoppel to enforce a pure unau-
thorised company contract.171 
However, s 19(5)(a) of the 2008 Act proceeds to reintroduce a modified version of 
the troublesome doctrine of constructive notice by stipulating that „[a] person must be 
regarded as having notice and knowledge of- 
any provision of a company‟s Memorandum of Incorporation contemplated in s 
15(2)(b) or (c) if the company‟s name includes the element “RF” as contemplated in s 
11(3)(b), and the company‟s Notice of Incorporation or a subsequent Notice of 
Amendment has drawn attention to the relevant provision, as contemplated in s 
13(3).‟172 
The provisions contemplated by s 15(2)(b) and (c) are: 
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 See Cassim FHI „Introduction to the New Companies Act‟ (2012) at 13. 
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 Subject to s 19(5), of course. 
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 Emphasis added. According to s 19(5)(b), persons must also be regarded as having notice and 
knowledge of the joint and several liability of past and present directors of a personal liability compa-
ny. The purpose of this paragraph is not clear. See Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the 
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 restrictive conditions applicable to the company; 
 impositions of a higher degree or more onerous standard than the degree or 
standard envisioned by s 16 of the 2008 Act for the amendment of a restric-
tive condition; and 
 provisions prohibiting the amendment of any clause in the MOI. 
It is therefore apparent that the statutory doctrine of constructive notice will apply on-
ly in very limited circumstances.173 If a company‟s MOI purports to restrict the com-
pany‟s powers in a manner envisioned by s 15(2)(b) and (c), but the company fails to 
comply with the prescribed formalities stipulated by s 19(5)(a),174 the statutory doc-
trine of constructive notice cannot find application. However, if a provision in a com-
pany‟s MOI limits the powers of the company and the formal requirements pre-
scribed by s 19(5)(a) have been complied with, third parties dealing with that compa-
ny must be deemed to have notice and knowledge of such limitation on the compa-
ny‟s powers.  
Immediately noticeable is the slightly different wording of the statutory doctrine of 
constructive notice versus its formulation at common law.175 Professor Jooste notes 
that the wording of s 19(5) could suggest that a positive doctrine of constructive no-
tice has been created, enabling persons other than the company to take advantage 
of the imputed „notice and knowledge‟.176 The correctness of such an interpretation, 
and the implications thereof, will be more fully discussed in Chapter Four.  
3.4.4 “RF” companies 
Read together, ss 11(3), 13(3), 15(2)(b), 19(1)(b)(ii), 19(5)(a) and 20(1) of the 2008 
Act, provide the option for a company to restrict its own powers by way of a “restric-
tive condition” in the company‟s MOI, by placing a greater restriction on the amend-
ment of a restrictive condition, or by way of a prohibition on the amendment of any 
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 Cassim MF „Formation of Companies and the Company Constitution‟ (2012) at 129. 
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 If a company‟s MOI includes a provision contemplated in s 15(2)(b), s 13(3) prescribes that the 
Notice of Incorporation filed by the company „must include a prominent statement drawing attention to 
each such provision, and its location in the Memorandum of Incorporation‟. In addition, s 11(3)(b) re-
quires the name of such a company to be immediately followed by the expression “(RF)”.    
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 In terms of the common-law doctrine of constructive notice, third parties were prevented from al-
leging that they were ignorant of the contents of a company‟s public documents. Alternatively, it was 
often said that the doctrine deemed persons dealing with a company to be aware of the contents of 
that company‟s public documents. See Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand 
Rule‟ (2012) at 179; see also 3.2.2 herein. 
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provision in the MOI. If a company limits its own powers in this way, it has chosen to 
become an “RF” company, a new category of company created by the 2008 Act. For 
these companies, certain of the consequences of the traditional ultra vires doctrine, 
as well as a codified doctrine of constructive notice, may affect their dealings with 
outsiders.  
The phrase „restrictive conditions applicable to the company' is not defined anywhere 
in the 2008 Act. In an effort to clear up the uncertainty regarding the use of “RF” in 
the name of a company, the CIPC released Practice Note 4 of 2012, which provided 
much-needed guidelines in that regard. Item 5 of the Practice Note is reproduced 
here in full: 
„Inconsiderate use of the expression “RF” in the name of a company could lead to un-
necessary confusion and in the circumstances it is submitted that the expression “(RF)” 
be used only in cases where it is evident that- 
1. the purpose or objectives of the company are restricted or limited in the MOI of the 
company; 
2. the powers of the company are restricted or limited in its MOI; 
3. any other pertinent restricting condition is applicable to the company; 
4. any requirement in addition to those set out in s 16, for the amendment of any of the 
abovementioned restrictions or limitations as contained in the MOI; or 
5. the MOI of a company contains a prohibition on the amendment of any particular 
provision of the MOI.‟  
Practice Note 4 of 2012 by implication suggests that the phrase “restrictive condition” 
means a restriction placed on the company‟s powers or on its MOI. While Item 5.3 
may be open to interpretation, it is submitted that the phrase „restrictive condition 
applicable to the company‟ should not be interpreted so as to include limitations on 
the authority of a company‟s agents, even if such restriction is reflected in the com-
pany‟s MOI. If all companies were required to include the suffix “RF” behind its name 
merely because the authority of the company‟s agents are restricted in some way, 
the result would be a considerable number of “RF” companies.177 The suffix would 
become commonplace, and could thus fail to alert outsiders in the manner it was in-
tended to do. In addition, it is submitted that the entire ethos of the “RF” provisions, 
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 Particularly in light of the fact that s 66(1) of the 2008 Act authorises the entire board of directors to 
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and of s 36 of the 1973 Act, is centered around the powers and capacity of compa-
nies, and not of their agents. The fact that both s 36 of the 1973 Act and s 20(1) of 
the 2008 Act were drafted to impact only on a situation where a director‟s lack of au-
thority is brought about solely by the company‟s lack of capacity, indicates that “re-
strictive condition” should not be interpreted to refer to limitations on the authority of 
a company‟s agents, where such limitation of authority is separate from a restriction 
on the company‟s capacity. Therefore, it is submitted that only where the MOI of a 
company limits the powers of the company in at least one of the three ways envi-
sioned by s 15(2)(b) or (c), should that company make use of the suffix “RF”. If a 
company merely imposes limitations on the authority of its agents in its MOI, it need 
not (and should not) call itself an “RF” company.  
In the event that a company elects to restrict its own capacity by inserting in its MOI 
a restrictive condition, it will subject itself to more or less the same arrangement in 
respect of capacity that existed for all companies under the 1973 Act. By making 
provision for “RF” companies, the Legislature has apparently intended to create a 
legislative “best of both worlds” in the South African company law landscape, where-
in aspects of the doctrines of ultra vires and constructive notice will remain available 
for those persons wishing to incorporate and invest in a company over which greater 
control can be imposed. It remains to be seen whether these types of companies will 
gain popularity in South Africa.178 
3.4.4.1 The validity of “RF”-company contracts 
Section 20(1) of the 2008 Act is clearly intended to replace s 36 of the 1973 Act. 
Section 20(1) reads as follows: 
„If a company‟s Memorandum of Incorporation limits, restricts or qualifies the purpos-
es, powers or activities of that company, as contemplated in s 19(1)(b)(ii)- 
(a) No action of the company is void by reason only that- 
(i) the action was prohibited by that limitation, restriction or qualification; or 
(ii) as a consequence of that limitation, restriction or qualification, the direc-
tors had no authority to authorise the action by the company; and 
(b) in any legal proceeding, other than proceedings between- 
(i) the company and its shareholders, directors or prescribed officers; or 
                                                          
178
 As of 28 October 2015, the number of registered “RF” companies in South Africa stood at 1814. 
See CIPC „RF Companies‟ (2015) available on request from the CIPC. 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
(ii) the shareholders and directors or prescribed officers of the company, no 
person may rely on such limitation, restriction or qualification to assert that 
an action contemplated in paragraph (a) is void.‟ 
Immediately noticeable is the fact that this section will not apply to all “RF” compa-
nies. If a company‟s MOI contains a provision prohibiting the amendment of any oth-
er provision in the MOI, it must call itself an “RF” company. However, if the company 
merely includes such a clause in its MOI without imposing a restrictive condition on 
the „purposes, powers or activities‟ of the company as envisioned by ss 20(1) and 
15(2)(b), it would enjoy the same contractual capacity as non-“RF” companies. In 
such a case, no aspect of the reformulated ultra vires doctrine should impact on the 
validity of any contract that the “RF” company concludes. 
However, if a company‟s MOI does restrict the „purposes, powers or activities‟ of the 
company, it thereby limits the company‟s contractual capacity. As was the case un-
der the 1973 Act, contracts concluded in excess of that capacity will not automatical-
ly be void. Just like its predecessor, s 20(1)(a) of the 2008 Act negates the external 
consequences of the ultra vires doctrine by proclaiming that ultra vires contracts are 
valid despite being beyond the capacity of the company. Section 20(1)(b) solidifies 
the position by prohibiting both the company and the third party from raising, in any 
legal proceedings between themselves, the company‟s lack of capacity to argue that 
the contract is void. However, the approach adopted by the 1973 Act regarding the 
internal consequences of an ultra vires contract has also been retained. The internal 
consequences of ultra vires contracts, namely that the company‟s lack of capacity 
may be raised by the shareholders, directors, and prescribed officers to restrain the 
company from acting ultra vires,179 and the responsible directors‟180 liability to the 
company for breach of their fiduciary duty not to exceed their authority, have been 
preserved by the 2008 Act.181 Therefore, the internal operation of the ultra vires doc-
trine has been retained under the 2008 Act to continue to „as a form of shareholder 
protection and protection for the company‟.182 
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 This remedy is provided for by s 20(5) of the 2008 Act. 
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 Section 1 of the 2008 Act defines a “director” as „a member of the board of a company, as contem-
plated in section 66, or an alternate director of a company and includes any person occupying the 
position of a director or alternate director, by whatever name designated‟. 
181
 See Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ (2012) at 170-1. 
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The ability to restrain the company from acting ultra vires enables a company‟s 
shareholders to exercise a degree of control over the contracts entered into on the 
company‟s behalf. This security and control could encourage investment. Arguably, 
the option to control the activities of directors represents one of the chief purposes of 
the Legislature‟s retention of the ultra vires doctrine through the “RF” provisions. 
However, it must be said that the measure of control provided to shareholders of 
“RF” companies over the actions of the directors remains somewhat limited, and may 
in fact prove to be no more than illusory, for in the ordinary course of events a com-
pany‟s shareholders would learn of an unauthorised contract only after the transac-
tion had already been concluded.183 The damage, as they say, will usually already 
have been done.184 Be that as it may, s 20(1) of the 2008 Act is commendable in that 
it aims to provide for this shareholder control, while at the same time protecting out-
siders from the worst effects of the ultra vires doctrine.  
Where s 20(1) of the 2008 Act differs markedly from its predecessor, is in the phrase 
„the directors had no authority to authorise the action by the company‟.185 Two argu-
ments, both with some merit, can be made in respect of the meaning of this phrase. 
Either s 20(1) can operate where any authorised representative concludes an ultra 
vires contract, or the legislation requires a director personally to conclude the con-
tract.  
Arguably, the wording of s 20(1)(a)(ii) removes the gap in the law that existed under 
the 1973 Act. It is common knowledge that boards of directors rarely involve them-
selves with the day to day business of the company, instead delegating authority to 
the managing director, senior employees, and other agents, to enter into contracts 
on the company‟s behalf.186 Perhaps the drafters of s 20(1) intended for the “RF” 
provisions to apply to ultra vires contracts concluded by all authorised company rep-
resentatives, and deliberately drafted the section to be construed in that way. The 
wording of s 20(1) would hardly be strained if called upon to support that interpreta-
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 Similar restrictions on the right to restrain were noted in respect of s 35 of the UK Companies Act 
1985, as amended by the UK Companies Act 1989, upon which the “RF” provisions were largely 
modelled. See Cassim FHI (1998) 301 and Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Tur-
quand Rule‟ (2012) at 173. 
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 However, the company may recover from the responsible directors any loss suffered by the com-
pany as a result of the ultra vires contract. 
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 See McLennan JS (1979) 336; Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ 
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tion, for if a company lacks the capacity to enter into a certain contract, a director 
cannot have the authority to empower another to conclude it; this is merely an exten-
sion of a well-understood principle. Instead of demanding that the directors them-
selves concluded the ultra vires contract, (which is what the wording of s 36 arguably 
did), s 20(1) could be interpreted so as to merely require the directors to have had no 
authority to authorise the contract. If that is the correct interpretation, s 20(1) com-
pletely closes the avenue of abuse highlighted by Naudé and McLennan. Perhaps 
the Legislature contemplated that in order to completely secure the release of com-
pany law from the grip of the worst effects of the ultra vires doctrine, the legislative 
solution must make provision for ultra vires company contracts concluded by all au-
thorised company representatives, regardless of their title. Indeed, if one adopts the 
view of Naudé and McLennan, one would be compelled to reject an interpretation of 
s 20(1) that would require a director personally to have concluded the ultra vires con-
tract. It could be argued that such an approach would frustrate much of the intended 
impact of the legislation, as it would allow the full force of the traditional ultra vires 
doctrine to affect contracts between outsiders and non-director representatives of 
those “RF” companies with restrictive conditions in their MOIs.    
In contrast, it could be argued that the Legislature purposefully restricted the applica-
tion of s 36 of the 1973 Act to ultra vires company contracts concluded by directors 
in order to protect shareholders, and intends for the same approach to apply in re-
spect of “RF” companies under the 2008 Act. It could be that Parliament was influ-
enced by the important purpose of safeguarding the interests of shareholders. In or-
der to provide greater protection to a company‟s shareholders, s 20(1) would have to 
be construed so as only to validate ultra vires contracts concluded by directors, and 
not those concluded by other agents. Directors are generally appointed in terms of a 
voting procedure involving the company‟s shareholders. A company‟s shareholders 
to some degree control the composition of the board of directors, but have less direct 
control over the appointment of senior employees and other agents. Therefore, Par-
liament may have been wary of unfairly prejudicing shareholders, and thereby dis-
couraging investment, if it were to enact legislation that would hold an “RF” company 
liable to ultra vires contracts concluded by non-directors.    
It is rather unfortunate that s 20(1)(a) of the 2008 Act is phrased in this way, as it 
creates needless uncertainty in this regard. It could be that the insertion of the 
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phrase „directors had no authority to authorise‟ was merely an oversight. Until a 
competent court pronounces on this issue, or the CIPC clarifies the position, the 
question of whether s 20(1) can find application where a non-director representative 
of an “RF” company concludes an ultra vires contract, will remain a matter for de-
bate. 
A slightly simpler solution exists to the question of what the position would be if a 
representative of an “RF” company concludes a pure unauthorised contract with an 
outsider.187 Since s 20(1) of the 2008 Act cannot affect pure unauthorised contracts, 
the common law would have to be reverted to: because an agent cannot bind his 
principal to an unauthorised contract,188 no valid contract can come into being. The 
failed contract cannot be rescued by s 20(1) but will be capable of ratification by the 
company‟s shareholders. If the shareholders refuse to ratify the agreement, the third 
party‟s only remaining means to bind the company to the contract would be agency 
by estoppel. This is where the 2008 Act may prove to provide greater protection to 
outsiders than its predecessor did. It has already been submitted that the statutory 
doctrine of constructive notice should not apply to provisions in an MOI of an “RF” 
company that merely limit the authority of the company‟s agents. The wording of s 
19(5)(a) and the guidelines of Practice Note 4 of 2012 suggest that the statutory doc-
trine of constructive notice cannot apply to such a provision. As discussed above, s 
19(5)(a) will operate in respect of three types of “public provisions” contained in the 
MOI of an “RF” company.189 The CIPC has not suggested that s 19(5)(a) is intended 
to apply to provisions in a company‟s MOI that restrict the authority of the company‟s 
agents. Therefore, under the circumstances set out above, the third party should be 
free to assert his ignorance of the representative‟s lack of authority. The conse-
quence of this is that the third party will not be barred from relying on agency by es-
toppel to validate the contract. This approach would constitute a welcome change to 
the position that prevailed for outsiders under the 1973 Act, as it provides greater 
protection to third parties in the context of pure unauthorised company contracts.   
However, it would seem that the concern expressed by Naudé, that a company may 
yet enforce the ultra vires doctrine against outsiders, remains valid under the 2008 
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Act. It may be that an “RF” company could achieve the effect created by the tradi-
tional doctrines of ultra vires and constructive notice by way of, for example, the in-
sertion of the following clause in its MOI: “The directors and other representatives of 
the company shall have no authority to bind the company to transactions which con-
flict with the restrictive condition/s to the company‟s powers, purpose and activities.” 
If an ultra vires contract is concluded by a director of that company, s 20(1) may not 
be able to find application.190 What is relatively certain is that the statutory doctrine of 
constructive notice will not apply to the clause limiting the authority of the company‟s 
representatives, but that it will operate in respect of the restrictive condition limiting 
the company‟s capacity. The third party will be deemed to have received notice and 
knowledge of the company‟s lack of capacity, but not of the separate limitation 
placed on the authority of the company‟s agents. Unfortunately for the third party, 
this is the point where the statutory doctrine of constructive notice may begin to show 
its teeth. As discussed above,191 one of the consequences of the common-law doc-
trine of constructive notice was that it would prevent an outsider from relying on 
agency by estoppel to hold a company liable to a pure unauthorised contract where 
the agent‟s authority was limited in a public document. Although the wording of the 
statutory doctrine of constructive notice differs somewhat from its formulation at 
common law, it is reasonable to assume that it is intended to have a similar impact 
against third parties dealing with companies. If the outsider must be regarded as 
having received notice of a restrictive condition in an “RF” company‟s MOI, he may 
find it difficult to assert that the company had held the director out as having the nec-
essary authority to conclude a contract in excess of the limits of the company‟s ca-
pacity. In fact, the effect of the statutory doctrine of constructive notice could be to 
prevent any discussion being had at all about the company‟s misrepresentation and 
the outsider‟s reliance thereon. Just like the common-law doctrine of constructive no-
tice under the 1973 Act, the statutory doctrine of constructive notice will arguably 
eliminate the possibility of an outsider holding an “RF” company liable on a pure un-
authorised contract by way of agency by estoppel, in such an instance. If that is the 
true position, then failing ratification of the contract by the company‟s shareholders, 
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the third party can look only to the purported agent to recover any loss suffered as a 
consequence of the failed contract.192 Since the number of companies that have 
elected to make use of the “RF” provisions remains relatively miniscule,193 this is not 
likely to be an issue that will arise too often. Yet, it remains undesirable for such a 
potential loophole to exist. 
As was the position under the 1973 Act, s 20(1) does not require the outsider to act 
in good faith. Nothing in the wording of s 20(1) prevents a third party dealing with a 
company from enforcing an ultra vires contract despite knowing full well that the pur-
ported contract was ultra vires at the time of its conclusion. As discussed above,194 
the absence of a requirement of good faith on the part of the outsider was rendered 
mostly insignificant by the broad powers which companies enjoyed under the previ-
ous framework. Therefore, the possibility of outsiders abusing the legislation in such 
a manner was minimal. Under the 2008 Act, “RF” companies enjoy as wide a con-
tractual capacity as their MOI permits, without the legislative addition of “ancillary 
powers” and “plenary powers”. Therefore, even a mala fide outsider contracting with 
an “RF” company, in full knowledge that the purported agreement is prohibited by a 
restrictive condition in the company‟s MOI, would be entitled to rely on s 20(1) to en-
force the contract. One can easily imagine how an outsider could take advantage of 
this loophole by conspiring with a director to hold an “RF” company liable to ultra vir-
es contracts.195 In light of the concerns expressed on this point regarding s 36 of the 
1973 Act, it could be argued that the Legislature erred in failing to close this avenue 
of abuse when enacting the 2008 Act. However, if one considers the historical opera-
tion of the ultra vires doctrine,196 one should realise that the third party‟s knowledge 
and motives have never been of any consequence to the question of the company‟s 
capacity to conclude a contract, and nor should they have been.197 The traditional 
ultra vires doctrine could never be negated by the fact that one party to the contract 
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had been acting in good faith. Therefore, the good or bad faith of a party to an ultra 
vires contract concluded with an agent of an “RF” company should likewise have no 
effect on the operation of s 20(1). Even in the context of a restraining application in 
terms of s 20(5) of the 2008 Act, the good or bad faith of the parties to an ultra vires 
contract should be irrelevant to the issues of the company‟s capacity and the con-
tract‟s validity.198  
3.4.4.2 Ratification in terms of s 20(2) of the 2008 Act 
According to s 20(2) of the 2008 Act: 
„If a company‟s Memorandum of Incorporation limits, restricts, or qualifies the pur-
poses, powers or activities of that company, or limits the authority of directors to per-
form an act on behalf of the company, the shareholders, by special resolution, may 
ratify any action by the company or the directors that is inconsistent with any such 
limit, restriction or qualification, subject to subs (3).‟199 
This section stipulates that if an “RF” company restricts its capacity in its MOI, and a 
director of the company contracts beyond that capacity, the shareholders will be enti-
tled to ratify the ultra vires contract by way of a special resolution.200 Section 20(2) of 
the 2008 Act therefore introduces a new internal consequence of the traditional ultra 
vires doctrine. Traditionally, ultra vires contracts were completely void and incapable 
of ratification, even with the unanimous approval of all of the company‟s members. 
Section 20(2) overrules this position by allowing for the ratification of ultra vires con-
tracts concluded by directors, provided such ratification is done by way of a share-
holders‟ special resolution. At first glance, this section may be slightly confusing, as s 
20(1) declares ultra vires contracts to be valid. It raises the question of the purpose 
of allowing for ratification of valid contracts. It is submitted that the purpose of mak-
ing provision for ratification of ultra vires contracts concluded by directors of “RF” 
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 Where the third party‟s good faith does become relevant, however, is in respect of any claim for 
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companies stems from the effect of s 20(5) of the 2008 Act.201 In addition, formal rati-
fication of an ultra vires contract would provide greater certainty for all the parties. If, 
for example, an outsider refuses to perform upon discovering that his agreement with 
an “RF” company was beyond its powers, ratification of the contract could put his 
mind at ease.    
Once an ultra vires contract has been ratified, it is arguable whether the remaining 
internal consequences should still apply.202 While the responsible directors would 
still, strictly speaking, have breached a fiduciary duty, they would likely incur no liabil-
ity to the company for it, for one or both of two reasons: either the special resolution 
ratifying the ultra vires contract also serves to ratify the directors‟ breach of fiduciary 
duty,203 or the directors would not be liable for damages as the company will have 
suffered no loss.  
The suggestion the ratification of an ultra vires contract retroactively authorises the 
responsible directors, and thereby erases the breach of the fiduciary duty, is not a 
particularly persuasive one.204 While such an explanation would be convenient, it 
fails to appreciate the basic limitation of ratification, namely that it is generally not 
capable of affecting personal rights acquired by third parties in the interim period be-
tween the unauthorised act and its subsequent ratification.205 If a director concludes 
an unauthorised contract on a company‟s behalf, the company becomes entitled to 
hold that director personally liable for any loss sustained by the company as a result 
of the unauthorised contract, on the basis of a breach of the director‟s fiduciary duty. 
In South Africa it has been accepted that while ratification by a fiction of law creates 
a contractual relationship between a professed principal and a third party as if the 
purported agent had been properly authorised, it certainly does not prevent the prin-
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cipal from suing the unauthorised agent for breach of contract.206 In Mine Workers’ 
Union v Broderick207 the Appellate Division stated: 
„A principal may for a variety of reasons choose to ratify an unauthorised contract en-
tered into by his agent but this does not mean that he has abandoned, as against the 
agent, any rights that he has against the latter for his breach of the terms of his 
agency.‟208 
It is accepted law that in the context of ratification, the relationship between the prin-
cipal and the third party is separate from the one between the principal and the 
agent. While an action based on the breach of a fiduciary duty is distinct from one 
based on breach of contract, should the same principle regarding ratification not pre-
vail? It is submitted that a special resolution ratifying an ultra vires contract, on its 
own, does not serve to retroactively authorise the directors to conclude the agree-
ment. Although the wording of s 20(2) refers to the ratification of „any act of the com-
pany or the directors‟, and could thus be interpreted to refer to ratification of a breach 
of the directors‟ fiduciary duty, such an approach should be avoided as it would be 
inconsistent with the principles of ratification at common law. It is submitted that in 
the absence of a second, separate special resolution ratifying the responsible direc-
tor‟s conduct and absolving him of liability,209 the director should remain liable to the 
company for breaching his fiduciary duty.  
It may be that the company‟s action against the director will become meaningless, as 
the company will in the usual course of events not have suffered any loss. Be that as 
it may, the mere fact that the shareholders choose to ratify an agreement should not 
automatically mean that they forgive the director and absolve him of all liability. It 
may be that the “RF” company has somehow suffered loss in the interim period be-
tween the moment the shareholders learn of the ultra vires contract and the moment 
they pass a special resolution ratifying it. Potential prejudice could be caused to the 
shareholders if, by their ratification of an ultra vires contract, they will be regarded as 
having ratified the responsible director‟s breach of his fiduciary duty. The conse-
                                                          
206
 For the simple reason that „[t]he principal may ratify and approve of what his agent has done or he 
may ratify and disapprove‟. See Kerr AJ The Law of Agency 4 ed (2006) 81. 
207
 1948 4 SA 959 (AD). 
208
 At 979. 
209
 Which was the position under the now-repealed UK Companies Act 1985. 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
quence of this would be that the company would be deprived of a basis to sue the 
responsible director for loss caused to the company by the ultra vires contract.210    
Furthermore, once the shareholders have adopted a special resolution ratifying the 
ultra vires contract, the company‟s insiders should lose their right to apply for an in-
terdict restraining the company from acting ultra vires.211 
It is submitted that the the phrase „or limits the authority of directors to perform an act 
on behalf of a company‟ is likely only to cause confusion. At common law, a pro-
fessed principal, whether a natural or a juristic person, was always entitled to ratify 
an unauthorised contract entered into by his or its representative.212 The members of 
a company would in the past have shown their acceptance of the terms of an unau-
thorised contract by way of compliance with the company‟s internal requirements for 
the ratification of pure unauthorised contracts, which would usually have been set 
out in the company‟s AOA. What is troubling is the fact that s 20(2) seems to refer 
not only to limitations on a director‟s authority flowing from the company‟s lack of ca-
pacity, but also to a director‟s lack of authority resulting from restrictions placed on 
his authority in the company‟s MOI.213 The 2008 Act does not expressly repeal or 
amend the common-law principles of ratification with respect to pure unauthorised 
contracts entered into by a company‟s directors. Therefore, s 20(2) poses several 
interesting and important questions, which may be worthy of academic attention.214  
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3.4.4.3 The insiders‟ right to restrain  
The right to apply for an interdict restraining a company or its directors from entering 
into or performing in terms of an ultra vires contract, was a remedy available to 
shareholders before the enactment of the 1973 Act. Under s 36 of that Act, however, 
it was thought that a company‟s shareholders could only restrain the company from 
concluding an ultra vires contract, but could not restrain the performance of an ultra 
vires contract once it had been properly concluded.215  
Section 20(5) of the 2008 Act slightly alters the position and now leaves little room 
for doubt, by broadly stating: 
„One or more shareholders, directors or prescribed officers of a company may apply to 
the High Court for an appropriate order to restrain the company or the directors from do-
ing anything inconsistent with any limitation, restriction or qualification contemplated in 
subs (2)‟. 
Section 20(5) presents certain interpretational challenges, most notably those re-
garding the intended interaction between the insiders‟ right to restrain and ratification 
in terms of s 20(2). However, a more practical issue is the scope of the right to re-
strain. Unlike under the 1973 Act, where a company‟s shareholders could only rely 
on the restraining action to prevent the company from performing in terms of the ultra 
vires contract, s 20(5) of the 2008 Act appears to permit a restraining application to 
prevent both the conclusion and the performance of an ultra vires contract. It is sub-
mitted that the words „doing anything inconsistent with any limitation, restriction or 
qualification‟ are broad enough to refer to both the conclusion and the performance 
of an ultra vires contract. Arguably, a wide interpretation to this phrase would provide 
a better balance between the insiders‟ right to restrain and the outsider‟s right to en-
force an ultra vires company contract. 
It is clear that an ultra vires contract concluded by a director of an “RF” company is 
only provisionally valid and enforceable, as s 20(5) of the 2008 Act allows for the in-
siders of an “RF” company to enforce against outsiders the restrictive conditions con-
tained in the company‟s MOI. By making provision for an application to restrain a 
company from acting ultra vires, s 20(5) merely codifies the remedy that had tradi-
tionally been available to shareholders. However, s 20(5) includes the directors and 
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prescribed officers216 as beneficiaries of this right. The legislation allows these par-
ties to make an application to the High Court for an order declaring an ultra vires 
contract void, and/or prohibiting the company from performing in terms of the agree-
ment. FHI Cassim suggests that the purpose of s 20(5) is „to draw a proper balance 
between the interests of the company and the rights of the third party‟ where an ultra 
vires contract is concluded.217 However, allowing the insiders of an “RF” company to 
restrain the company from acting ultra vires will always have the potential to cause 
prejudice to third parties.218 The effect of s 20(5) is to limit an “RF” company‟s con-
tractual capacity in a manner similar to the traditional ultra vires doctrine.219  
What, then, is the intended relationship between ss 20(2) and 20(5) in the context of 
ultra vires contracts? At the outset, it must be remembered that since ultra vires con-
tracts concluded by “RF” companies will not automatically be void, there is no real 
legal need for the shareholders to ratify such contracts. The need to do so may arise, 
however, if one of the insiders declares his intention to invoke s 20(5) of the 2008 
Act.  
If the shareholders of an “RF” company adopt a special resolution ratifying an ultra 
vires contract, the contract should become unquestionably valid. In order to maintain 
a logically consistent legal framework, a subsequent restraining application under 
such circumstances should not be possible. Ratification of an ultra vires contract un-
der s 20(2) should prevent any person relying on s 20(5) to restrain the company 
from performing in terms of the ultra vires contract.220 Therefore, once the ultra vires 
contract has been ratified by the company by way of a special resolution of the 
shareholders, the company‟s insiders should lose their right to apply for a court order 
preventing the company from acting ultra vires. If ratification in terms of s 20(2) truly 
trumps a subsequent restraining application in terms of s 20(5), then it is tentatively 
submitted that the option to ratify ultra vires contracts was primarily made available 
to serve as a means for a company‟s shareholders to preemptively prevent a re-
straining application being instituted by a single director, shareholder or prescribed 
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officer. Ultimately, s 20(2) grants to shareholders an extra measure of control over 
the business of an “RF” company. 
Conversely, if a shareholder, director, or prescribed officer has successfully relied on 
s 20(5) to obtain a court order restraining an “RF” company from entering into or per-
forming in terms of an ultra vires contract, the company‟s shareholders should not be 
able to ratify it. To hold otherwise would conflict with the most basic limitation of rati-
fication at common law, namely that it is not „a legal miracle which renders non-
existent everything which transpired between the inception of the inchoate juristic act 
and its validation‟.221 The legal fiction of ratification can generally not affect rights ac-
quired and duties imposed between the moment of conclusion of a purported con-
tract and the moment of its ratification.222 For the above reasons it is submitted that it 
should not be possible for the shareholders of an “RF” company to ratify an ultra vir-
es contract that has been declared void or unenforceable by a court order. Once the 
restraining application has been granted, the shareholders should not be able to val-
idly ratify the agreement unless and until that court order is overturned.  
It should also be borne in mind that a court, if approached in terms of s 20(5) of the 
2008 Act, would be under no obligation to grant the restraining application. Further-
more, there does not seem to be a reason why the remaining directors, shareholders 
and prescribed officers, or even the third party for that matter, could not oppose the 
application to restrain the company from acting ultra vires. Indeed, opposing the ap-
plication may in certain circumstances be a more effective means of ensuring that 
the contract remains binding than securing ratification by way of a special resolution. 
If one considers the wording of s 20(2), it would seem that s 20(5) also grants insid-
ers of either category of company the right to restrain the directors from acting in ex-
cess of their authority as curtailed in the company‟s MOI. Section 20(5) appears to 
make provision for a restraining application where a proposed company contract is 
not ultra vires, but merely beyond the authority of the director that concluded it. It is 
submitted that making the right to restrain applicable to pure unauthorised company 
contracts concluded by directors is not only wholly unnecessary, but also likely to 
cause confusion in the same way that s 20(2) muddies the waters of ratification of 
pure unauthorised contracts concluded by directors. A pure unauthorised contract is 
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void ab initio;223 no performance can be made in terms of a void contract as no valid 
obligations can arise. These common-law principles of agency and contract are well 
established. Therefore, the purpose of providing to insiders a statutory right to apply 
for an order prohibiting a company or its directors from doing anything inconsistent 
with a clause in the company‟s MOI which limits the authority of the company‟s direc-
tors, is difficult to understand. 
One final question regards the potential impact of the statutory doctrine of construc-
tive notice in the context of a restraining application in terms of s 20(5). It is submit-
ted that if a restraining application is instituted by an insider of an “RF” company, and 
such application is opposed by a third party,224 the third party, who will be arguing 
that the company should remain bound to the agreement, will be prevented by the 
statutory doctrine of constructive notice from asserting that he was unaware of any 
restrictive conditions in the company‟s MOI. Whether this prohibition will assist or 
hinder him with his claim will depend on the facts of the particular case. 
3.5 A company‟s liability for unauthorised contracts 
It is at this point that the first of the two research questions posed by this thesis will 
be addressed. If an outsider concludes an unauthorised contract with an agent of a 
company, with the intention of creating a contract between the company and the out-
sider, what is the legal status of the contract? The answer is, unfortunately, not a 
straightforward one. Broadly speaking,225 the framework of the 2008 Act requires a 
proper appreciation of the effect of the following two criteria when assessing the va-
lidity of unauthorised company contracts:  
(i) what category of company one is dealing with; and 
(ii) which type of unauthorised contract one is speaking of.  
3.5.1 A non-“RF” company‟s liability for an ultra vires contract 
Since a non-“RF” company by its very nature has no restrictions placed on its pow-
ers, no contract its agent concludes can be ultra vires. In fact, the very concepts of 
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capacity and powers have been (mostly) removed from the company law landscape 
as a result of s 19(1)(b) of the 2008 Act. No form nor aspect of the ultra vires doc-
trine can affect the validity of contracts concluded on behalf of companies that do not 
take the steps envisioned by the “RF” provisions. That being the case, the only other 
potential ground226 upon which the validity of a non-“RF” company‟s contract could 
be challenged would be the authority of the agent that had concluded it.  
Assuming that the representative was properly authorised to enter into the agree-
ment on the company‟s behalf, the contract will be valid.227 
3.5.2 A non-“RF” company‟s liability for a pure unauthorised contract 
The consequences of a company‟s agent concluding a contract in excess of his ac-
tual authority have never been as straightforward as would be the case if only natural 
persons were involved in the transaction. In order to address the reality that the in-
ternal management of companies brings with it additional complications, company 
law has had to develop special rules to supplement the more general agency princi-
ples.228 Two significant rules in this regard are the doctrine of constructive notice and 
the Turquand rule. The Turquand rule was introduced to ameliorate the harsh effects 
of the doctrine of constructive notice, in an effort to provide greater protection for 
third parties that contract with companies. The two rules therefore usually operated 
side by side. Since there is no doctrine of constructive notice imputing deemed 
knowledge on outsiders of the contents of the MOI of a non-“RF” company, the need 
for the Turquand rule (in this context) falls away. Even if the authority of the agent 
was curtailed by an internal requirement reflected in the company‟s MOI, third parties 
cannot be deemed to know about it.  
Therefore, the relationship will be governed purely by agency principles. Because 
the agent was not authorised to conclude the transaction, the contract will be re-
garded as void from the moment of its purported conclusion. The contract will be a 
nullity but, as discussed above,229 it will be capable of ratification. Should the share-
holders refuse to ratify the agreement, agency by estoppel will be available to the 
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third party, regardless of whether the exclusion of the agent‟s authority was reflected 
in a clause in the MOI.230 
3.5.3 An “RF” company‟s liability for a pure unauthorised contract 
The relationship between a properly incorporated “RF” company and its agents re-
mains subject to the law of agency. Since a pure unauthorised contract is unauthor-
ised not because the contract exceeded the company‟s capacity, but because the 
representative that concluded it had acted in excess of his actual authority,231 s 20(1) 
of the 2008 Act will not find application. The common law of agency must therefore 
be reverted to.  
In accordance with the law of agency, the pure unauthorised contract will be void ab 
initio.232 However, the contract may be ratified by the company‟s shareholders. The 
third party may also rely on agency by estoppel to validate the contract,233 even if the 
exclusion of the agent‟s authority was contained in the company‟s MOI.234  
3.5.4 An “RF” company‟s liability for an ultra vires contract 
The effect of s 20(1) of the 2008 Act is that an “RF” company‟s lack of capacity will 
not necessarily invalidate an ultra vires contract concluded by a director of the com-
pany. It remains to be seen whether s 20(1) will or should find application where the 
agent that concluded the ultra vires contract was not a director. This is an important 
question that needs answering, as the common law will render ultra vires contracts 
void. It is unfortunate that the precise ambit of s 20(1)(a) of the 2008 Act remains un-
clear. What is certain is that the section will definitely operate in the event that a di-
rector concluded an ultra vires contract on behalf of an “RF” company, and where no 
other reason existed for the director‟s lack of authority except the company‟s lack of 
capacity.  
If s 20(1) does find application, the ultra vires contract will be valid and provisionally 
enforceable, subject to a potential restraining application in terms of s 20(5) of the 
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Act. The “RF” company will be obligated to perform in terms of the ultra vires con-
tract, unless the High Court orders otherwise. 
3.6 Conclusion  
The existence of an agent‟s authority to bind a company will always be a vital con-
sideration when assessing the validity of company contracts. Outsiders dealing with 
companies should be wary when dealing with purported agents of companies, and 
should always look to confirm the existence of an agent‟s authority before contract-
ing with him. If this precautionary measure is followed, it would rarely be necessary 
to rely on the company‟s ratification or on litigation.  
It has been discussed how the traditional ultra vires doctrine effectively operated as 
a guarantee for a company‟s shareholders that the company‟s finances would not be 
used for a purpose other than the purpose for which the company had been 
formed.235 Indeed, that very justification for the ultra vires doctrine is arguably the 
reason why the Legislature retained remnants of the ultra vires doctrine in the 2008 
Act: the protection offered by restrictive conditions and the “RF” provisions will pro-
vide greater security and control to the shareholders of these companies. It may be 
that the “RF” provisions are intended to encourage investment by persons wishing to 
have certainty regarding a company‟s business dealings. In addition, the fact that di-
rectors of “RF” companies can incur personal liability to the company for breaching 
their fiduciary duty to act within their authority, should act as an incentive for them 
not to exceed their authority. It is submitted that “RF” companies and the reformulat-
ed ultra vires doctrine are designed to promote shareholder control over the busi-
ness of a company and the actions of its directors. This is evident from the fact that 
while all insiders of “RF” companies, individually or collectively, are empowered to 
approach the High Court to restrain an ultra vires contract, only the company‟s 
shareholders may validly ratify such agreements. 
Unfortunately, the legislative arrangement under the 2008 Act still presents a certain 
level of risk for outsiders contracting with “RF” companies. If an outsider and a direc-
tor of an “RF” company conclude an ultra vires contract, the enforceability of the 
agreement will depend on whether the company‟s insiders wish to abide by it. Just 
one dissenting insider may frustrate the contract by exercising his right to apply for 
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an interdict restraining the company from performing in terms of the agreement. This 
is hardly a desirable position for the outsider to be in. Also, the question of whether s 
20(1) of the 2008 Act applies to ultra vires contracts entered into by non-directors, 
remains unanswered. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that outsiders should exercise 
caution when dealing with all purported agents of companies, especially agents of 
“RF” companies. Before dealing with an “RF” company, outsiders should take the 
time to examine the company‟s MOI to determine whether it contains any restrictive 
conditions limiting the company‟s contractual capacity. In the event that a person has 
already concluded an ultra vires contract with an “RF” company, the only way for him 
to completely secure his position would be to request that the shareholders of the 
company adopt a special resolution ratifying the agreement.  
In the following chapter, the investigation into the legal position created where an 
agent of a company concludes an unauthorised contract will be broadened. Chapter 
Four will analyse the position of the unauthorised agent and discuss his potential lia-
bility to compensate a third party who has suffered loss as a result of an unauthor-
ised contract. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE AGENT’S LIABILITY TOWARDS THE THIRD PARTY 
4.1 Introduction 
The crux of the law of agency lies in the intention to create a juristic act between a 
represented person and a third party.236 In order to create such a juristic act, the rep-
resentative must have been authorised to conclude it on his principal‟s behalf. If the 
representative lacks the necessary authority, he cannot bind the principal to the juris-
tic act. The same principle applies to the relationship between a company and its 
agents.  
Yet, directors are different from regular agents in many respects. Just one such dif-
ference is the fact that the conduct of directors is regulated by both the common law 
and the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the 2008 Act). In keeping with the theme of this 
thesis, Chapter Four will analyse the impact of the 2008 Act on the liability of the 
agent to a third party for loss caused by an unauthorised contract. This issue is par-
ticularly important because in a world where many contracts are concluded on a dai-
ly basis, the law of averages suggests that unauthorised agency is bound to oc-
cur.237 
Obviously, if an unauthorised contract is validated by ratification, agency by estop-
pel, or by s 20(1) of the 2008 Act, there will usually be no discussion of holding the 
agent liable for the third party‟s consequential losses. If the contract is adopted by 
the company, the third party can generally have no cause for complaint: he has got-
ten exactly what he has bargained for. Therefore, this chapter will focus on the liabil-
ity of the agent in the event that an unauthorised company contract is “absolutely” 
void, in the sense that s 20(1) is not applicable or the contract has been restrained 
by a court order, the company refuses or is unable to ratify the agreement, and the 
elements of agency by estoppel are not present. Unfortunately for the third party in 
such a scenario, he is left with an unenforceable contract. Even worse, he may have 
suffered loss as a result of its purported conclusion. The issues that this chapter will 
investigate are whether the purported agent with whom the unauthorised contract 
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 See Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ in De Wet JC (founding ed) LAWSA vol1 Third Reis-
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237
 See Busch D & MacGregor L (eds) The Unauthorised Agent; Perspectives on European and Com-
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was concluded can be held liable to compensate the third party for any loss caused 
thereby, what the extent of the liability would be, and what influence the 2008 Act 
could have. These issues are significantly important for all outsiders dealing with a 
company‟s agents. 
4.2 The authority of directors 
As mentioned in Chapter One, a director's functions often include those of an agent 
in the “true” sense: in other words, directors may be called upon to conclude juristic 
acts on the company‟s behalf.238 Naturally, directors need authority to validly bind a 
company to contracts.  
The powers of boards of directors were traditionally derived from authorisation by the 
company‟s shareholders.239 Under the previous dispensation, the authority of a com-
pany‟s directors was usually made provision for in that company‟s AOA. The 2008 
Act has altered the position by replacing the AOA with the MOI, and by conferring 
statutory authority on all directors of companies.240 
The MOI will therefore not be the sole source of the authority of a company‟s direc-
tors. Section 66(1) of the 2008 Act confers on all directors the „authority to exercise 
all of the powers and perform any of the functions of the company‟, subject to the 
company‟s MOI and the remaining provisions of the Act. It is therefore apparent that 
the authority of a company‟s directors is now derived directly from statute, and not 
from the company‟s constitutive documents. The wording of s 66(1) is extremely 
broad: the phrase „exercise all of the powers and perform any of the functions of the 
company‟ certainly envisages the conclusion of contracts, as one of the functions of 
a company is to conclude business transactions.241 Section 66(1) effectively confers 
on each and every director of a company the authority to make decisions, including 
contractual ones, on the company‟s behalf.242 Therefore, directors will automatically 
be empowered to conclude any company contract. However, directors are not free to 
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 R Cassim argues that the similarity between directors and other agents is less obvious than it was 
under the previous dispensation, as the powers of directors are now derived directly from s 66(1) of 
the 2008 Act. See Cassim R „Governance and the Board of Directors' in Cassim FHI (man.ed.) et al 
Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) at 412. 
239
 See Van der Heever QS The powers of Directors and Limitations (unpublished LLM thesis, Univer-
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do as they please. The conduct of directors will remain subject to their common-law 
fiduciary duties and the remaining provisions of the 2008 Act, the most important of 
which is s 76.243 In addition, a company‟s MOI may include provisions limiting a di-
rector‟s authority, and/or provisions rendering the authority of directors subject to the 
fulfillment of an internal requirement.  
4.3 The warranty of authority 
As a general rule, company‟s agent will incur no liability whatsoever in respect of a 
contract between the company and a third party.244 However, nothing prevents the 
outsider from concluding a separate contract with the representative.245 Either within 
the principal contract or separately, the agent may promise that his authority is 
above board, and undertake to assume some measure of liability to the third party if 
it transpires that he has exceeded his authority.246 Such an agreement is called a 
warranty of authority.247 
The warranty of authority is a separate contract from the one between the company 
and the outsider, even though the two may be reflected in the same document.248 In 
the event that the company repudiates a purported contract because the agent who 
concluded it had acted in excess of his authority, the agent will be in breach of the 
warranty.249 The nature and extent of the purported agent‟s liability to the third party 
for breach of a warranty of authority will be determined by the terms of that con-
tract.250 Contractual liability in this context is without doubt the simplest form of a 
purported agent‟s liability towards a third party for an unauthorised contract. It would 
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 Section 76 of the 2008 Act codifies many of the fiduciary duties of directors. See Cassim FHI „The 
Duties and the Liability of the Directors‟ in Cassim FHI (man.ed.) Contemporary Company Law 2 ed 
(2012) 507. 
244
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Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) at 350; Kerr AJ The Law of Agency 4 ed 
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principal‟s contractual obligations. See Joubert DJ „Agency and Stipulatio Alteri‟ (1996) at 351.  
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merely require the contract to be properly interpreted to ascertain the extent of the 
purported agent‟s liability. 
However, in the absence of a warranty of authority between the agent and the third 
party, the third party may yet have a claim against the agent. South African private 
law recognises the right of a third party to sue a purported agent for damages arising 
from the conclusion of an unauthorised contract. Such liability would be based either 
on delictual principles,251 or on the breach of a fictional contract (the “implied warran-
ty of authority”).252  
4.4 The common-law liability of the unauthorised agent towards the third party 
Where a purported agent causes loss to a third party as a result of an unauthorised 
contract, and no express or tacit warranty of authority had been concluded, the third 
party does have a claim against the purported agent to make good such loss. How-
ever, a preliminary caveat is necessary. It must be noted that a great deal of uncer-
tainty remains in South African law regarding the legal basis and extent of the pur-
ported agent's liability towards a third party in such circumstances.253 It is clear that 
the measure of calculating the awardable damages will depend on the legal basis of 
the claim. Unfortunately, there are divergent views on this point among academ-
ics.254 What is certain, is that South African law does allow for a claim by a third party 
to hold a “false” agent personally liable for the third party‟s loss arising from an unau-
thorised contract. According to Innes CJ in Blower v Van Noorden, equity demands 
that the purported agent be liable to make good the third party‟s loss in such an in-
stance.255 But the legal basis of such a claim, as well as the nature and extent of the 
purported agent‟s liability, remains a matter for debate.  
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 See Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ (2014) para 168. 
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 A rule formulated by Innes CJ in Blower v Van Noorden 1909 890 TS at 900-901. 
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What can also be regarded as relatively certain is that an order of specific perfor-
mance cannot be granted against the purported agent, unless such a result was in-
tended by the parties in a contractual provision to that effect. South African law has 
firmly moved away from Voet‟s rule that the purported agent in such a situation au-
tomatically becomes liable on the contract itself.256 The logic of the rejection of 
Voet‟s view seems to be irrefutable: since an agent is a mere representative, holding 
him liable to the contract would effectively create a new contract which neither the 
third party nor the purported agent had intended to create.257  
Arguably, the nature of the remedy available to the third party will depend on the cul-
pability of the purported agent in misrepresenting his authority. A misrepresenta-
tion258 can be defined as a wrongful and culpable, incorrect or misleading represen-
tation to another, who acts on the strength of the representation, to his detriment.259 
South African law certainly recognises delictual liability for negligent misrepresenta-
tions that cause pure economic loss,260 even if the misrepresentation occurred in a 
contractual context.261 In principle, there does not seem to be a reason why such lia-
bility cannot extend to an intentional misrepresentation. Indeed, provision was made 
under both Roman and Roman-Dutch law for an action in the event of an intentional 
misrepresentation.262 Therefore, if the purported agent intentionally or negligently 
held himself out as having more authority than he had, or as having authority where 
he had none, a delictual claim based on the purported agent‟s misrepresentation 
may become available.263  
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 Voet J Commentarius ad Pandectas 14.3.6. See Harker JR „The Liability of an Agent for Breach of 
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However, if the purported agent had acted without fault, ie innocently, he cannot be 
held liable in delict. The South African law of delict does not recognise a general ac-
tion based on faultless conduct.264 If delict was the only available basis for such a 
claim, an agent who innocently misrepresents the existence of his authority cannot 
be liable for the third party‟s damages. At the very least, academics are generally in 
agreement that a delictual action against the purported agent will be available to the 
third party only if the purported agent had intentionally or negligently misrepresented 
the existence of his authority.265 
Fortunately, a set of facts came before Innes CJ in Blower v Van Noorden which re-
quired the learned chief justice to determine „the legal position of a man who enters 
into a contract as agent of a named and existing principal, in the real, but mistaken, 
belief that he has authority so to contract'.266  
In Blower v Van Noorden, Innes CJ fashioned the “implied warranty of authority” a 
basis for holding a purported agent personally liable for a third party's damages 
caused by an unauthorised contract. The basis for a purported agent‟s liability in 
such circumstances was held to be an implied agreement arising from the agent‟s 
representation of authority.267 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ported agent will not be liable if the third party knew or could determine that the purported agent did 
not have the requisite authority. Furthermore, the learned authors argue that the Appellate Division‟s 
recognition in Claude Neon Lights of a causal connection being required between the misstatement of 
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See Dendy M „Agency and Representation‟ (2014) para 168.  
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Considerable uncertainty remains regarding the true legal basis of such an action.268  
All that can safely be said is that the purported agent‟s personal liability in such cir-
cumstances is liability arising from operation of law. However, it is questionable 
whether this ex lege contract can come into being when the purported agent did not 
have contractual capacity at the relevant time.269 
It is clear that the purported agent‟s culpability (or lack thereof) will play an important 
role with regards to the legal basis or bases of the third party‟s claim against him. As 
a result of Blower v Van Noorden, which has never been overruled, every time an 
agent purports to contract with a third party on behalf of a named and existent princi-
pal, an ex lege contract between the third party and the purported agent comes into 
being. The content of this agreement is that the purported agent warrants the exist-
ence of his authority, and, should it transpire that his authority was lacking, he prom-
ises to place the third party in „as good a position‟ as if the professed principal had 
been bound. Breach of the implied warranty of authority will be available to a third 
party even if the purported agent‟s conduct was blameless.270 In addition, where the 
agent‟s misrepresentation of authority was intentional or negligent, a delictual action 
should be available to the third party. At the very least, outsiders can rest assured 
that the law will not leave them without recourse against a purported agent who mis-
represents the existence of his authority, whatever the purported agent‟s motives 
may have been. 
4.4.1 The extent of the liability 
Once it has been established that a purported agent is liable for damages to a third 
party who has suffered loss as a result of an unauthorised contract, the extent of his 
liability must be determined. As discussed above, the purported agent cannot be 
compelled to render specific performance on the contract itself, unless the terms of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
part of the agent, a personal undertaking that his principal shall be bound by the contract, and that, if 
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the agreement make provision for this. What, then, is the precise measure of calcu-
lating the damages claimable by a third party against the purported agent in such 
circumstances? Naturally, the particular cause of action with which the third party is 
successful will determine the measure of calculating the awardable damages. 
4.4.1.1 Delictual liability for misrepresentation of authority 
If the basis of the third party‟s claim is the purported agent‟s intentional or negligent 
misrepresentation, the method of calculating damages will be the delictual one of 
negative interest.271 This would require the court to have regard to the position the 
third party would have been in had the delict not occurred, in other words if the pur-
ported agent had not misrepresented the existence of his authority. However, this 
seemingly simple approach may prove to be problematic in a situation of unauthor-
ised agency. Does it require a court to consider the position the third party would 
have been in had the purported agent been duly authorised, or the position the third 
party would have been in had the purported contract never been concluded? If the 
first approach is to be adopted, there would be a need to enquire into the financial 
position of the professed principal, a party in no way responsible for the situation.272 
If the second approach is preferred, Kerr speculates that the third party may argue 
that he would have contracted with someone else had he not contracted with the 
purported agent. Of course, the third party would have to prove that he would have 
entered into this alternative contract, and what benefits would have accrued to him in 
terms thereof. Such a case would necessitate the court having to look at the financial 
position of the person with whom the other contract would have been concluded, and 
not of the professed principal.273 
Further important considerations that will arise if the third party‟s claim was based on 
delict would be the fact that the principle of contributory fault274 and the rule on miti-
gation of loss would apply. Furthermore, the third party will be entitled to claim dam-
ages for non-patrimonial loss,275 which would not be the case if his claim was based 
on contract.  
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Assessing a third party‟s damages based on a misrepresentation of authority may 
prove to be a challenging exercise, as it will always be difficult to establish precisely 
what the third party‟s position would have been had the purported agent not misrep-
resented the existence of his authority. However, it should be borne in mind that the 
assessment of damages has never been a perfect science. All that can be hoped for 
is that in each particular case, the greatest measure of equity will be found. 
4.4.1.2 Liability for breach of the implied warranty of authority 
The limits of the so-called implied warranty of authority have never been thoroughly 
investigated by an appellate level South African court.276 The rule laid down by Innes 
CJ in Blower v Van Noorden requires the purported agent to place the third party in 
the position he would have been in if the professed principal was bound to perform in 
terms of the agreement. This approach accords with the method of calculating con-
tractual damages.277 The implication of Innes‟ rule is that regard must be had to the 
financial position of the professed principal when calculating the damages awardable 
to the third party.278 Therefore, if the professed principal is insolvent or a “man of 
straw” and incapable of performing in terms of the agreement, the purported agent is 
not liable; the purported agent, by doing nothing, will already have placed the third 
party in the position he would have been in had the professed principal been bound. 
However, to ensure some measure of equity in such a circumstance, it is submitted 
that the purported agent should remain liable for restitutionary damages. 
JC De Wet noted several potential stumbling blocks in calculating damages in this 
way: inter alia, the position the third party would have been in had the purported 
agent had authority may sometimes be difficult to determine.  Indeed, the purported 
contract may be of such a nature that its value to the third party cannot even be as-
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sessed if the contract never comes into existence.279 Kerr also acknowledges the po-
tential practical difficulties in applying the terms of the “implied warranty of authority”, 
in particular those arising from the fact that the third party will be required to prove 
his loss. This would necessarily require an investigation into the professed principal‟s 
ability to perform in terms of the unauthorised contract. Should the professed princi-
pal be compelled to disclose his financial position when the entire situation has noth-
ing to do with him? As a means to avoid needlessly inconveniencing and possibly 
causing harm to an innocent person, Kerr suggests that a court should assume that 
the professed principal is able to meet the relevant obligations in terms of the con-
tract, unless the purported agent can „show reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
he is unable to do so‟;280 and that only if the purported agent can do that should the 
professed principal be subjected to questioning regarding his financial position.281 
While this may seem to be a relatively sensible approach, it is submitted that the ap-
propriateness of enquiring into the financial position of the professed principal must 
depend upon the facts of the particular case. In addition, requiring the purported 
agent (who is being sued) to show reasonable grounds for anything would conflict 
with the fundamental principle that the plaintiff in civil proceedings bears the onus of 
proof. If the third party alleges that the professed principal was capable of meeting 
the relevant contractual obligations, the duty should be on him (the third party) to 
prove it.  
4.5 The effect of the statutory doctrine of notice  
Section 19(5)(a) of the 2008 Act poses a rather interesting question with regards to 
an agent's liability for his unauthorised actions. Professor Jooste notes that ss 19(4) 
and 19(5)(a) could be construed in a manner that creates a positive doctrine of con-
structive notice, capable of being relied upon by persons other than the company.282 
The wording of s 19(5)(a) of the Act does not expressly prohibit outsiders, or even 
insiders for that matter, from relying on the statutory doctrine of constructive notice. 
Section 19(5)(a) of the Act is unambiguous: all persons must be regarded as having 
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notice and knowledge of all restrictive conditions contained in the MOI of an “RF” 
company that has complied with the formal requirements for ring-fencing. That being 
the case, can an agent rely on s 19(5)(a) to escape personal liability to third parties 
for damage caused by the conclusion of absolutely void ultra vires contracts? In the 
absence of an express or tacit warranty of authority, such liability would either be 
based on delict or on the implied warranty of authority. Regarding delictual liability, it 
would seem that the third party‟s claim could be defeated by s 19(5)(a) if the section 
creates a positive doctrine of constructive notice. If a third party contracting with a 
principal through an agent is deemed to know that the agent lacked the requisite au-
thority,283 he may find it difficult to prove that the agent had misrepresented his au-
thority. If the third party cannot prove that the agent misrepresented the existence of 
his authority, no delictual liability can be established. Likewise, if the third party was 
not induced to contract by the agent‟s misrepresentation of authority, there can be no 
discussion of the agent‟s liability under the implied warranty of authority.284 There-
fore, can an agent of an “RF” company rely on s 19(5)(a) as a shield to protect him-
self from being held personally liable to outsiders in such circumstances? The an-
swer to this question will depend on the scope of the statutory doctrine of construc-
tive notice. 
It is submitted that s 19(5)(a) should be interpreted with regard to the historical oper-
ation of the common-law doctrine of constructive notice. Historically, the constructive 
notice doctrine was a rule that could only be called upon by a company in order to 
protect its own interests, and was never available to any other party except the com-
pany.285 The doctrine of constructive notice, being a negative doctrine, could never 
be relied upon by a company‟s agents to escape personal liability for their unauthor-
ised acts. While the wording of s 19(5)(a) of the 2008 Act does not expressly forbid 
an insider from relying on it, the section does not expressly allow for such reliance 
either. In the absence of an express legislative indication to the contrary, should the 
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spirit of the common-law doctrine of constructive notice not prevail? A positive doc-
trine of constructive notice could operate to exclude two key common-law remedies 
which a third party would ordinarily have had against an agent who caused loss to 
the third party as a result of a misrepresentation of authority. It is submitted that this 
could not have been the Legislature‟s intention. 
For these reasons, it is submitted that the statutory doctrine of constructive notice 
should, just like its formulation under the common law, remain a negative doctrine 
solely aimed at protecting the interests of “RF” companies. In order to ensure that 
the interests of third parties dealing with “RF” companies are protected, s 19(5)(a) 
should not be available to the company‟s agents to protect themselves from personal 
liability to the third party.  
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter it was demonstrated that an agent‟s liability for loss caused to a third 
party as a result of an unauthorised contract is anything but a straightforward issue. 
When contracting with an agent of any company, outsiders would be well advised to 
bind the agent to an express warranty of authority, because (a) it provides greater 
security in the event that the company repudiates the agreement due to the agent‟s 
lack of authority, and (b) the outsider can better regulate the nature and extent of the 
agent‟s liability. This would avoid the complexities involved in placing reliance on the 
law of delict or on the implied warranty of authority.286   
Chapter Five will provide a conclusion to this thesis and suggest certain safeguards 
that outsiders can employ when concluding contracts with companies.  
                                                          
286
 See Kerr AJ The Law of Agency (2006) 249-250. 
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    CHAPTER FIVE 
    CONCLUSION 
This thesis commenced with a discussion of the principles of the law of agency, fo-
cussing on the concepts of authority, agency by estoppel, and ratification. The point 
of departure was the principle that authority is required for successful representation. 
However, it was observed that a professed principal may yet incur liability for unau-
thorised contracts entered into by his agent, by way of the principal‟s ratification of 
the unauthorised contract, or by way of the third party‟s successful reliance on agen-
cy by estoppel. The rules of agency are of particular importance with regards to the 
relationship between a company and its representatives, particularly as all directors 
now have statutory authority to bind a company to contracts.287  
The concept of a company‟s capacity, the doctrine of ultra vires, and the statutory 
doctrine of constructive notice, will only be relevant in respect of certain “RF” com-
panies. By virtue of s 19(1)(b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the 2008 Act), com-
panies that do not take any of the steps envisioned by the “RF” provisions will effec-
tively have the same contractual capacity as natural persons, enabling them to con-
clude most types of contracts in connection with any lawful enterprise. As a result of 
s 19(4), outsiders dealing with companies shall no longer be prevented from raising 
against the company the outsider‟s ignorance of the contents of the constitutive doc-
uments of the company. Therefore, persons dealing with non-“RF” companies will 
not have to fear the consequences of the doctrines of ultra vires and constructive no-
tice. However, they will still be affected by the authority of the agent with whom they 
are contracting. Under the 2008 Act, the only consideration for outsiders when deal-
ing with non-“RF” companies will be whether the agent with whom they are dealing is 
in fact authorised to bind the company to the relevant contract. The importance of 
this factor cannot be overstated, as the scope of an agent‟s authority greatly impacts 
on the validity of the company contracts he attempts to conclude. In this regard, the 
outsider cannot afford to be satisfied with the assurance of the agent himself.288 
                                                          
287
 By virtue of s 66(1) of the 2008 Act. 
288
 For it is a representation by the professed principal that justifies reliance on agency by estoppel. 
As was stated by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Glofinco v Absa Bank, „[a]ssurances by an agent as 
to the existence or extent of his authority are therefore of no consequence when it comes to the rep-
resentation of the principal inducing a third party to act to his detriment‟. At para 13. 
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As a result of the enactment of the “RF” provisions, aspects of the ultra vires doctrine 
and a statutory reformulation of the doctrine of constructive notice will influence con-
tracts between certain “RF” companies and outsiders. The real-world impact of the 
“RF” provisions is far from clear. It has been suggested that the “RF” provisions are 
intended to operate as shareholder protection, on the one hand, and as an incentive 
for directors of “RF” companies to act within the limits of their authority,289 on the 
other.290 How effective the “RF” provisions will be at achieving these goals remains 
to be seen. If the “RF” provisions were indeed intended to allow for the incorporation 
of a type of “special purpose vehicle”,291 a company incorporated for a single or lim-
ited purpose, one must question how effective such special purpose vehicles would 
be in light of the fact that ultra vires contracts concluded by directors of “RF” compa-
nies are not per se void.292  
Whatever the potential benefits for shareholders and investors that the “RF” provi-
sions may bring, it is relatively certain that s 20(1) of the 2008 Act will present a sig-
nificant amount of risk to outsiders. The vital implication of s 20(1) of the 2008 Act is 
that if an outsider concludes a contract with a director of an “RF” company which vio-
lates a restrictive condition contained in the company‟s MOI,293 the contract will be 
valid, but voidable upon application to the High Court by an insider of the company. If 
an outsider concludes an ultra vires contract with a director of an “RF” company, his 
legal position and prospects of enforcing the agreement will be subject to the will of 
the company‟s insiders, and the High Court‟s granting or refusal of a potential re-
straining application in terms of s 20(5) of the 2008 Act. In addition, the statutory 
doctrine of constructive notice will deem all outsiders to have knowledge of restrictive 
conditions contained in the MOIs of “RF” companies.  
Therefore, outsiders should take great care when dealing with “RF” companies: be-
fore the contract is concluded, they need to determine whether a restrictive condition 
is applicable to the company, and if so, whether and to what extent the company‟s 
                                                          
289
 As directors of “RF” companies run the risk of incurring personal liability to the company for 
breaching their fiduciary duty to act within their powers. 
290
 See Cassim FHI „Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule‟ in Cassim FHI (man.ed) et 
al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) at 174-5, where the learned author comments that the 
ultra vires doctrine has now „developed into issues of fiduciary duties and shareholder rights‟.  
291
 See Cassim FHI „The Companies Act 2008: An Overview of a Few of its Core Provisions‟ (2010) 
22 SA Merc LJ 157 at 171. 
292
 See Cassim FHI (2010) 171. 
293
 And all the formal requirements for ring-fencing had been complied with. 
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contractual capacity is limited. The only way to do this is to examine the “RF” com-
pany‟s MOI. If an outsider concludes a contract with an “RF” company, and only af-
terwards discovers that it is ultra vires, he should request that the company‟s share-
holders ratify the agreement in terms of s 20(2) of the 2008 Act in order to ensure 
that the contract remains valid and enforceable. 
In the event that an unauthorised company contract is concluded between an agent 
of a company and an outsider, the outsider may have a claim against the purported 
agent to recuperate consequential losses sustained by the third party. The liability of 
the agent in such an instance may be contractual, delictual, or liability arising from 
operation of law. In order to avoid unnecessarily complicated and costly litigation, 
outsiders dealing with companies would be well-advised to bind the representative to 
an express warranty of authority. 
In conclusion, it is clear that the consequences of unauthorised agency in company 
law are more straightforward than they were before; the 2008 Act is commendable in 
this respect. However, the “RF” provisions are far from perfect. This thesis has high-
lighted certain issues which are in need of clarification, and will hopefully serve as an 
adequate contribution to academic thinking on the complicated issues of capacity 
and authority in company law.  
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